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I. Introduction
In an earlier article in this Journal, The Limits of Collective Bar-
gaining in Public Employment,1 we asked whether private sector col-
lective bargaining should serve as the model for collective bargaining
in the public sector. We concluded it should not. Our argument was,
and is, that a wholesale transplant from one sector to the other is inap-
propriate. First, market restraints on union power are substantially
1. 78 YAL L.J. 1107 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Limits].
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different in the two sectors. Second, the consequences of such a trans-
plant for the political process are undesirable. A summary of our
reasoning follows.
In the private sector, a high degree of substitutability between va-
rious products generally exists: a price increase of one product relative
to others will result in a decrease in the number of units of that prod-
uct sold as consumers adjust their preferences to changed price rela-
tionships. Wage increases which exceed rises in productivity usually
result in higher prices. Private sector unions generally face, therefore,
a trade-off between the level of benefits they can extract from an em-
ployer and the level of employment for union members they can main-
tain. Even when this is not the case-as with expanding industries or
products with inelastic demand curves-the threat of both the substi-
tution of capital (machines) for labor and of competition from non-
union employers is a significant restraint on union power. Thus,
although the private sector is extremely diverse and contains many
exceptions, the costs of collective bargaining are kept within arguably
tolerable limits by a market of free consumers.
In the public sector, the trade-off between increased benefits and
employment is of little importance to public employee unions. The
products and services provided by government generally do not have
close substitutes and are not subject to competition from non-union
enterprises. The reduction of unionized governmental services, more-
over, will be resisted not only by the union involved but also by the
beneficiaries of those services-the local voters. The pressure on the
political leaders, then, will be either to seek new funds or to reduce
other governmental services or subsidies.
We concluded that what is involved in public sector bargaining is
the redistribution of income by government rather than the allocation
of resources by market forces. The desirability of a transplant-in-
cluding the right to strike-turns, therefore, on the effect of full col-
lective bargaining on the political process.
What Robert A. Dahl has called the "'normal' American political
process"2 contemplates "a high probability that an active and legiti-
mate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some
crucial stage in the process of decision." 3 The issue is whether a full
transplant of collective bargaining will, over time, permit well-estab-
2. R. DAiL, A PREFACE To DcAoxc THEORY 145 (1956).
3. Id.
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lished public employee unions to exercise a disproportionate share of
power in "the process of decision." If public employee unions are free
to strike as well as to employ the usual methods of political pressure,
interest groups with competing claims and different priorities will be
put at a competitive disadvantage and the political process will be
distorted.
The interruption of most governmental services will severely incon-
venience the beneficiaries of those services, who will, as voters, press
for a settlement. Nor will many be concerned about the cost of the
settlement. While an inflated municipal budget and tax rate create
countervailing pressures, these pressures are often not significant in
the typical large city. The delayed effect of a particular settlement on
an already incomprehensible municipal budget or tax structure is
rarely a matter of high visibility, and it may be in the interest of the
political leaders, as well as the unions, to see that it does not become
so. The cost of settlement, moreover, may be borne by a constituency,
the whole state or nation, different from that which insisted on a quick
end to the strike. Therefore, the public employee strike, given the
typical political structure of the large municipality, is a powerful
political weapon. Since other interest groups rarely have a similar
weapon regularly available to them, the strike, if it becomes the normal
method for breaking collective bargaining impasses, will give public
employee unions a disproportionate share of political power.
In addition, the functioning of the " 'normal' American political
process" will be altered not only in the way it determines monetary
issues, critical as they are, but also in the way it resolves other matters
which, while they affect union members, are traditional grist for the
political mill. The decentralization of the governance of schools or
the creation of a civilian tribunal to review the conduct of police of-
ficers are but two matters of political moment likely to arise at the
bargaining table. Strikes over such matters would, of course, cause
some organized interest groups to support a mayor who resisted the
union demands. Other groups, however, inconvenienced by the strike
and perhaps indifferent to the underlying issues, would mount in-
creasing and frequently irresistible pressure on political leaders to
bring about a settlement by compromising with, or capitulating to,
the union.
These, then, are the discomforting conclusions of the Limits article.
We went on to say:
In the future, if strikes are to be banned, sophisticated impasse
808
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procedures must be established. If, on the other hand, some strikes
are to be tolerated, changes in the political structure which will
make the municipal employer less vulnerable to work stoppages
must be developed. And, in any event, legislative action will be
necessary either to separate out those non-monetary issues which
might not be decided solely through collective bargaining, or
to change bargaining procedures so that all interested groups
may participate in the resolution of such issues. These legislative
choices and legal procedures will be the subject of a forthcoming
article.4
This is that article.
Initially, and by way of establishing a framework, we address two
general questions: first, the extent to which a single structure, at either
the state or federal level, should govern municipal labor relations; and
second, the impact of collective bargaining on the role of government
and the functions it performs. We then examine at length what may
in short be called the strike problem: what mechanisms can replace
the strike if it is to be prohibited; what sanctions should back up the
prohibition; and, if strikes are to be permitted in non-emergency situ-
ations, what steps can be taken to reduce the vulnerability of the polit-
ical process. Finally, we address the scope of bargaining issue: what
should be the role of collective bargaining in resolving disputed issues
which involve terms and conditions of employment but which are also
matters of political import.
II. Uniformity and Diversity
Since full collective bargaining by public employees may distort the
political process, regulation and changes in the structure of bargaining,
other than those imposed by law in the private sector, are necessary.
The goal of such restructuring is to ensure that one particular interest
group, public employee unions, does not gain a substantial competitive
advantage over other interest groups in pressing its claims on govern-
ment. We are not under any illusion that there now exists some perfect
balance among interest groups which must not be disturbed. This is
not the point. Of course we favor reform where it is justified. The
point is simply that it is a mistake to institutionalize through laws
techniques that have the promise of giving one group too much power.
Those aspects of private sector collective bargaining that are not
4. Limits at 1127.
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inconsistent with this goal, however, should be transplanted to the
public sector. Given national endorsement of collective bargaining as
the preferred means of ordering the private labor market, considera
tions of evenhandedness suggest the establishment of roughly similar
institutions in the public sector. As the Limits article demonstrated,
many of the claims which support private collective bargaining press
for some form of extension to public employees.5 To deny such an
extension is to challenge collective bargaining generally. We decline,
as we did in our earlier article, to reexamine these claims, and assume
they are sufficiently valid to enable us to pursue the implications of
private sector policy for public employees.
A. Recognition and the Establishment of Bargaining
The establishment of collective bargaining through peaceful and
mandatory6 recognition procedures, 7 including appropriate provisions
for unit determination and a means of ascertaining employee desires,
is not inconsistent with the "'normal' American political process," for
the danger to that process stems mainly from strikes.
Although a policy of non-recognition seems to protect the political
process from public employee unions, it is generally not a realistic al-
ternative. Non-recognition is too drastic, too plainly at odds with the
premises of collective bargaining in the private sector. It runs the risk
of being perceived by society generally, and by public employees in
particular, as excessive and unfair. A legal policy which causes a gen-
eral adverse reaction will be unacceptable to those whose conduct it
seeks to control, and society may have qualms about its enforcement.
Additional consequences may follow. When a non-recognition policy
fails, it will be replaced by a collective bargaining law. That law
should impose restrictions on public sector unions beyond those suf-
fered by other unions. It should, that is, if the political process is to
remain intact. Yet, the prior policy of non-recognition, particularly
5. Id. at 1111-17.
6. Some states have permissive recognition procedures operative at the option of a
municipal employer. See ALAS. STAT. §§ 23A0.010 (1959).
7. This article does not deal explicitly with the question of whether recognized unions
need be exclusive bargaining representatives. It will suffice to say here that the authors are
not persuaded that exclusivity is always an essential element of a successful collective
bargaining relationship, particularly in the case of professional employees who seek to use
bargaining as a means of affecting the nature of the services they perform. See p. 859,
infra. Where that is the case, the public interest might arguably be best served by per-
mitting minority groups of employees to be heard, thus avoiding the risk that differences
in viewpoints relevant to important issues of government policy-e.g. the disciplining of
students by teachers-will be exposed and not submerged in the internal politics of the
umon.
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if it has been adhered to rigidly, may have generated cynicism toward
attempts to impose such restrictions. A non-recognition policy, there-
fore, may not only prove unacceptable and unenforceable itself, but
may also create conditions which limit the range of alternative poli-
cies.s
Beyond establishing mandatory recognition procedures, all we can
say with assurance about the proper role of law in public employment
is that there is no one "right" law. Indeed, a diversity of structures
must be created. Those structures should be designed with two prin-
cipal problems in mind: the strike and the scope of bargaining. The
bulk of this article consists of a discussion of those two problems. We
suggest a number of mechanisms and structures, some complementary,
some mutually exclusive. Which are appropriate for adoption by a
particular city must be determined by political judgments as to a
large number of variables. No one structure, no one mechanism can
be recommended for all municipalities.
B. The Role of Federal Regulation
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court indicates that
federal power to regulate the relations between local governments and
their employees exists.9 But the existence of a power is not by itself
the justification for its exercise. That depends on a demonstration of
federal responsibility and a congressional capacity to fashion workable
policies. We believe that structuring collective bargaining by local gov-
ernmental units is a matter of very low priority on the federal agenda,
and that desirable structures are best attained by local regulation.
Federal legislation seems, therefore, inappropriate.
There are many important differences between the private and public
sectors in terms of federal responsibility. Among these are matters of
legal history'0 and a hope in 1935 that the Wagner Act would be an
8. See Limits, 1108-09. Thus the concept of sovereignty, having been employed to ban
all collective bargaining, is now regarded by some as having no weight at all.
9. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
10. When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended, 29 US.C. §§ 151-168 (1964), it was acting against a history of federal
regulation of collective bargaining. By applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to unions in
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) the Supreme Court had imposed a federal regulatory
scheme on union activities. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The
Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE LJ. 14, S0-38 (19633. That
the rules imposed were largely judge-made did not matter. The point was that they
could not be changed by state legislatures but only by Congress. And, for better or worse,
that body was irrevocably plunged into the debate over the legitimacy of collective
bargaining in the private sector. No such historical background exists as to public sector
unions.
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anti-Depression measure." The most important difference, however,
stems from the nature of competitive markets. In the private sector,
firms compete in the sale of their products across state lines. To permit
widely varying labor policies among the states might benefit those
firms operating where the law favored unionism least. Not only would
that disrupt competitive relationships; it would also limit the effective-
ness of laws in other states designed to encourage collective bargaining.
If collective bargaining were to become a favored policy, it had of neces-
sity to be formulated at the federal level so that competitive pressures
would not destroy it.
No such pressures exist in the public sector. New York City teachers
are not paid less because of competition from the school system of
Decatur, Georgia. Municipal employers simply do not compete in an
interstate product market which effectively prevents some states from
adopting collective bargaining as a policy because others do not.
When an issue is a matter of low federal priority, considerations of
federalism dictate that governmental action be left to state or local
initiative. One can claim more, however, than that municipal public
employee bargaining should have a low priority on any agenda for
congressional action. One can claim that intervention at the national
level would be positively harmful. Federal legislation or regulation
necessarily tends to a uniform rule. In the case of public employee
unionism, uniformity is most undesirable and diversity in rules and
structures virtually a necessity.
Consider just two important examples, although many more exist.
We have stated that recognition ought to be mandatory on the part
of the municipal employer. But that duty alone necessarily involves
the enforcement tribunal in the bargaining of the parties. Just as the
National Labor Relations Board cannot avoid imposing some minimal
duty to bargain as part of the duty to recognize a union,12 so too a
tribunal enforcing a municipality's obligation to recognize must de-
termine whether it is in fact bargaining with the union and making a
good faith effort to reach an agreement. Even so minimal an intrusion
11. In 1935, the nation was still in The Great Depression, and some believed that an
economic cure might be found in devices thought to increase the purchasing power of
lower income groups. As the preamble to the Act attests, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964), believers In
the "purchasing power" theory thought collective bargaining such a device. Whatever one
thinks of "purchasing power" theory-and as far as we are concerned, not much-it may
be effectively pursued only at the federal level. Collective bargaining by public employees,
however, is not generally thought of as an anti-depression device, and even if "purchasing
power" devotees were shown some sympathy today by informed opinion, that particular
call for federal action seems muted.
12. H. WELINGTON, LABOR AND =H- LEGAL PRocEss 49 et seq. (1968).
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entails involvement in matters which may be sensitive issues of local
government. Complicated fiscal structures, local budgetary practices,
charter limits on taxes, state restrictions on tax increases, statutes des-
ignating how certain services are to be performed, etc., may severely
limit the power of municipal bargainers to negotiate in a fashion
deemed essential as well as traditional by the union.' 3 And when that
is the case, the union will quite naturally turn to an enforcement
tribunal for an order to bargain on the grounds that it has not been
truly "recognized." Equally intractable is the question of who "bar-
gains" for the "employer" with, for example, a teacher's union in a
typical small town: the first selectman, board of selectmen, town
meeting, board of finance or board of education? That question must
be resolved before a legal duty to recognize can be effectively enforced.
If the tribunal is a federal one, uniform rules as to the structure of
local governments may be the result of such litigation. It under-
states the case more than a little to say that resolution of such issues
at the federal level would be undesirable.
Consider also whether strikes ought to be permitted. We argue in
subsequent pages that appropriate structures can be created in which
strikes of a non-emergency nature should not be illegal. Essential to
the establishment of such structures is the adoption of devices which
reduce the vulnerability of particular municipal political processes to
such strikes. What measures will accomplish such a reduction dearly
will vary from municipality to municipality and no uniform rule
ought to be imposed.
C. The Role of State and Local Regulation
The role for state legislation seems considerably larger, although
perhaps not as large as that for the municipalities. Subordinate govern-
mental units, such as towns, counties and cities, derive their power
from the state. Many of the functions performed by lesser governmental
units which seem prone to unionization are already performed under
significant state regulation. Education, welfare, and health services are
frequently provided under a blend of state and local control. Limiting
tax structures may have been imposed by a state legislature. And, as
a matter of history and tradition, state responsibility for seeing that
local governmental functions are performed without interruption has
always been substantially greater than that of the federal government.
13. See Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining,
67 MxcH. L. REv. 919 (1969).
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State regulation, moreover, promises a more flexible approach than
national legislation. State officials are likely to be more sensitive to
problems of local government than federal officials, and legislation
which proves inappropriate can be more easily modified at the state
level than at the national. Many of the limitations which constrain
municipalities in bargaining with unions are the result of restrictions
imposed by the state. And within a particular state, a common history
gives some assurance that the diversity in local governmental structures
will be less than that among states.
Nevertheless, considerable room ought to be left for local regulation
and experimentation. The variables are so numerous that compre-
hensive legislation even at the state level may introduce unwise
uniformities. The strike question, for instance, largely turns on the
vulnerability of local political structures. The availability of adequate
measures to reduce that vulnerability will vary from place to place
as will the need to permit strikes rather than resort to other kinds of
impasse procedures. Some devices, such as partial operation schemes,
necessarily must be worked out on a community by community basis.
The scope of bargaining issue will be of different orders of magnitude
in different communities. Absent some imperative dictating one rule
for all, such matters can be left to local regulation.
The difficulty with state abstention, however, is that municipal in-
action may result in labor crises which cannot be ignored by state
officials. There is room, therefore, for state legislation which encourages
municipal regulation tailored to the needs of the particular commu-
nity, but which also provides the legal structure minimally necessary
for effective bargaining.
We conclude first that the state should establish a mandatory recog-
nition procedure. As to every other provision, a lesser governmental
unit should be free to opt out of the state scheme and provide its own
mechanisms. The state law should make strikes illegal and provide post-
impasse procedures. Local governments might, however, permit vari-
ous kinds of strikes, provide different impasse procedures, redefine
mandatory subjects of bargaining, establish procedures for the resolu-
tion of non-monetary issues, etc. Such a statutory scheme, with areas of
concurrent power, both encourages local initiative and inventiveness,
and guards against the dangers of local inertia.
We also conclude that a state level agency with dual functions ought
to be created. First, it should be empowered to enforce the applicable
provisions of the state statute and to implement the impasse proce.
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dures. Second, it should be available to take on functions delegated
to it by municipal regulation. Thus, if a municipality decided to
permit non-emergency strikes, the task of determining whether an
emergency existed might rest with this agency. Or, if the municipality
desired to adopt impasse procedures which varied from those of the
state statute, this agency could be empowered to administer them.
The value of such an agency stems not only from the experience and
specialized skills it would gain, but also from the fact that it would be
neutral so far as municipal labor disputes were concerned. This is es-
sential, for many of the devices we suggest in subsequent pages would
best be implemented by a neutral rather than by a party to the dispute.
D. The Governing Variables
In order to tailor a public employee bargaining law to serve best
the needs of a particular municipality, an almost infinite number of
factors must be considered. And largely political judgments as to the
relative weight to be given to each factor must be made by those
responsible for local governance. We can only catalogue the more im-
portant variables.
The functions that local government performs must be considered
in determining what kind of collective bargaining structure should be
erected. The number of employees who are potential union members,
the kinds of services they provide, the reliance of the community on
these services, their essentiality in terms of maintaining public health
and safety, the extent to which the character of particular services may
become politically controversial, and the ability of the local government
to shed certain functions all have a bearing on the form various
provisions of the law ought to take.
The nature of local governance in a structural and operational sense
is also of great importance. The extent to which political power is cen-
tralized or diffused, the visibility of budgetary decisions, the shape of
the tax structure, the way particular unionized services are funded and
the financial and legal relationships with larger political units all have
implications for decisions as to the scope and structure of bargaining,
the nature of ratification by the public employer and the strike ques-
tion.
Size is also a major factor. In small towns, the claims on government
will differ from those in a large city. It may be easier for concerned
citizens to form ad hoc interest groups-for example, taxpayer orga-
nizations-which can critically scrutinize the demands of public em-
815
The Yale Law Journal
ployee unions, and publicize the budgetary effects of wage settlements,14
Moreover, where the public employee has a personal relationship with
those who rely on his services-as he often does in smaller communi-
ties-he may feel less inclined to disappoint that reliance by striking.
Where these circumstances exist, the political process may not be
significantly endangered by public employee strikes.
The homogeneity of the political entity's population is yet another
factor. A homogeneous population makes politically explosive con-
frontations over non-monetary issues unlikely; thus, the law can focus
on the resolution of wage disputes. Where social, ethnic and racial
heterogeneity exists, however, it may be necessary to establish proce-
dures through which other interest groups can become involved in
bargaining over disputed political matters.15
The nature and history of the bargaining relationship is also im-
portant to legal structure. Expectations created by existing practices
ought not to be disturbed, or relationships that actually work restruc-
tured, except for fundamental reasons. This may mean, for instance,
that where a very high degree of militancy among union members
exists, the goal of protecting the political process from disproportion-
ately powerful unions might better be achieved by a structure which
reduces the vulnerability of the political process to strikes rather than
by one which prohibits strikes altogether.
Finally, the attitude of the community generally toward collective
bargaining must be weighed. Where the prevailing ethos is hostile to
unions, a number of options ranging from a total prohibition on
strikes to mere reliance on hostility to unions are available.1 0 Where
the ethos is different and significant segments of the community feel
strongly about the importance of the right to strike, structures per.
mitting non-emergency strikes, and reducing the vulnerability of the
political process to them, may be more appropriate.
1
A diversity of structures, then, seems not only inevitable but de-
14. The publication of individual salaries has stirred a reaction in a smaller city. See
note 105, infra, and accompanying text.
15. The racial composition of the disputants is clearly an important factor governing
the explosiveness of a dispute. In Memphis and Charleston, the employees were pre-
dominantly black, while the political forces dictating the employers' response were white.
The New York decentralization dispute, on the other hand, involved white employees and
black citizenry.
16. The most tolerant legal approach to public employee strikes is found in Vermont,
See note 34, infra, and accompanying text.
17. Such an ethos prevails in Michigan and appears to have led to a legal structure
in which it is difficult to enforce the anti-strike ban. See notes 34 and 84, infra, and
accompanying text.
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sirable. The pages that follow suggest a number of alternative direc-
dons public employee bargaining laws might take. Choice among struc-
tures depends on essentially political judgments weighing the factors
sketched above.
III. Collective Bargaining and the Role of Government
A. Bargaining as a Limiting Factor on Governmental Functions
One of the touchstones of the debate between modem-day liberals
and conservatives is the question of what functions government may
properly undertake. At one end of the political spectrum are those
who, because of their belief in individual freedom as a value in itself
and as a means to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number,
and because of their profound skepticism about the ability of govern-
ment to perform in a controlled and efficient manner, would limit
government strictly to areas where large social cost is clearly involved.
At the other are those who are more sanguine about the ability of
government to achieve stated ends, and who believe that the total
quantum of individual freedom need not be reduced by a large gov-
ernmental role in restructuring society along egalitarian lines.
We decline to join the debate over these issues, not only because
they are somewhere in the great beyond so far as this article is con-
cerned, but also because we have no desire to terminate prematurely
an otherwise pleasant collaboration. The relevance of collective bar-
gaining in the public sector to that debate, however, must be con-
sidered.
Local government presently performs an extraordinary range of
functions: health (in-patient, out-patient, at home care, preventive,
educational, etc.'8); education; sanitation (sewers, refuse collection);
housing; transportation (streets, trucks, autos, buses, subways, air-
ports, etc.); utility (water, gas, electric); social (baby-sitting to social
work); clerical; police; fire; recreational (parks, zoos, museums, etc.);
food (in government buildings). Among those employed in providing
these services are skilled, unskilled, and professional persons directly
involved in each service, and support personnel, who perform custodial
and maintenance functions. Some of these occupations-for example,
18. Among the kinds of employees involved are nurses (practical, and registered),
'doctors (of various kinds), orderlies, public health specialists, elevator operators, mainte-
nance, etc.
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refuse collection-are prone to labor disputes. 0 And it seems clear
that the sum of the problems a municipality faces grows substantially
as these services are unionized. The time, energy and resources ex-
pended by the municipality on collective bargaining matters increase
along with unionization. In addition, political difficulties multiply
quickly. Only a lucky politician, or one with a very divided opposition,
can survive a series of strikes which inconvenience his constituents."0
An increase in the number of unionized services, moreover, aggra-
vates the difficult question of parity or relative wage rates.21 Govern-
ment employees engaged in one service are neither ignorant of nor
indifferent to the wage scales in other services. Transit workers, sani-
tation workers, policemen and firemen formulate their demands with
an eye to what the others have extracted through bargaining. It is no
coincidence that the most militant postal workers' local is in a city
in which the ratio of mailmen's wages to comparable municipal em-
ployees had recently been drastically altered to the mailmen's detri-
ment.2 2 The spread of unionization in a city thus makes all settlements
harder to achieve.
Finally, public employee labor disputes too often polarize society by
raising delicate political issues in ways that reduce the area of permis-
sible compromise and compel political leaders to appear to make deci-
sions on ethnic or racial grounds. Recent labor disputes in Memphis,
Charleston and New York are paradigmatic cases.
This is not to say that the unions are right or wrong on the under-
lying merits of any issue. It is to say that the answer to the question
of whether a particular function is appropriate for government de-
pends in part upon the growth of public employee unionism. Refuse
collection, for example, seems highly susceptible to unionization.
Whether it should be continued as a municipal function, contracted
out to a private employer, or left entirely to free enterprise, should
19. Memphis, Atlanta, New York and Cincinnati have had notable disputes. Warren,
Michigan, found a solution in contracting out refuse collection to a private firm.
20. Mayor Lindsay's career was clearly endangered by such a series of disputes. Ills
ability to avoid a pre-election school strike through a handsome settlement as well as lls
good fortune in facing two candidates who split the opposition vote and were unattractive
to those most alienated by his handling of the decentralization dispute, may have accounted
for his victory.
21. Relative wage rates also create difficult problems in the private sector. Railroads
and newspapers are examples. See L. REYNoL s and C. TAFT, Tim EvoLtrroS oF WAoG
STRuaruRE 19 et seq. (1955).
22. Because employers and industries in the private sector face different demands for
their products and different cost structures and have different abilities to substitute capital
for labor, it is easy to overestimate the importance of "pattern.setting" in the private sec-
tor. Where non-profit employers are involved, however, as in the public sector, pattern-
setting may be more prevalent.
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no longer be determined without considering the inescapable prob-
lems that flow from collective bargaining. 3 Indeed, many functions
presently performed by local governments should be reconsidered in
the light of emerging public employee unionism.
To the extent that public employee unionism is a factor in deter-
mining what functions a municipality ought to perform, we believe it
always operates in the direction of limiting the role of government.
For although a number of constructive suggestions can be made as to
legal structures which will help to prevent a distortion of the political
process, one must be realistic. Many statutory schemes will fail; many
will have only limited effect. That being the case, we believe that
where the appropriateness of the government's performing a function
is in doubt, the fact of public employee unionism should encourage
government to decline to undertake it or to cease to perform it.
B. The Value of Interposing a Private Employer
The traditional view, however, is that collective bargaining is not
a factor tending to limit government's role because the nature of the
function involved is such that it makes little difference whether a
public or private employer performs it.-4 A strike inconveniences the
public neither more nor less because refuse collection remains the mu-
nicipality's responsibility rather than that of a private employer. The
inconvenience caused by the strike will create political pressures on
the mayor to achieve a settlement in either case. The source of the
funds to be used in the settlement is the municipal budget whether the
function is performed directly by the city or is contracted out to pri-
vate employers. The same is true even when private enterprise carries
out the function without a government contract. For then, pressure
for a settlement may generate pressure for a governmental subsidy.
Indeed, the Limits article itself suggested that the differing impact of
collective bargaining in the two sectors might call for reexamination of
collective bargaining in certain areas of the private sector and, in parti-
cular, in those industries which rely mainly on government contracts."
Contracting functions out to private employers will not return col-
23. Warren, Michigan, has, in fact, contracted this function out to a private firm. In
San Francisco, refuse collection is done by private employers who, during the 1970 general
strike by public employees, continued their operations, thus reducing the potential mag-
nitude of the emergency.
24. See generally Burton and Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strihkes by Public
Employees, 79 YALE .j. 418 (1970).
25. Limits, at 1124 n.57.
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lective bargaining to a state identical with the private sector's paradigm
case, one where the product market substantially limits union bargain-
ing power. On the other hand, we believe that contracting out, all other
things being equal, is preferable to retaining a function that has been
unionized. There are several reasons why this is so.
First, while there have been few general (or almost general) strikes
by public employees, there have been some. A recent one in San
Francisco was made less unbearable because that city does not collect
refuse. The garbage men are unionized, but they did not join the
strike.
Second, a private employer is better organized to resist union de.
mands than a political subdivision. The organization of a private
business is directed largely to one end: the maximization of profits.
While there may be internal conflicts over policy, and policy may be
formulated only after a series of internal bargains, the hierarchical
structure of a firm permits a final decision binding all those within it.
Public employers are organized for totally different purposes. There
is a division of power between state and local levels, and within each
level there are complex organizational arrangements designed to divide
functions and allocate power in a way which creates a system of checks
and balances. The principal purpose of these structures seems to be to
encourage division and weakness-or at least to prevent omnipotence.
As a result, a united front by a public employer in a labor dispute
frequently is impossible; each affected group or political unit within
the government will have a different perspective on the dispute and
will pursue its interest in the matter individually. This fact has not
been lost on the unions. Two of the principal adversaries in the most
recent New York City sanitation dispute, for example, were the Mayor
and the Governor. And in Hartford, Connecticut, the firefighters'
union wields such effective power in the city council that it has es-
chewed the legal role of exclusive bargaining representative in order
to avoid negotiating with a relatively obdurate executive.
The organization and motives of a private employer, then, seem
better suited to countervail union power than those of a public em-
ployer. The threat of unemployment as a result of increased benefits,
moreover, is greater in private employment. The profit motive creates
an incentive to resist wage demands and to place capital elsewhere if
the return is too low. The private employer is better able to substitute
capital for labor as a result of a change in the relative costs of those
factors of production.
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To be sure, the one-step removal of government from the perfor-
mance of functions does not solve the problem of the disruption of
essential services by a strike. We are, however, accustomed to deal with
the emergency strike problem in the private sector and there is reason
to believe, given the right balance of political forces, that appropriate
legal structures can be erected so as to approach a tolerable solution
to that problem.26 Furthermore, transforming an emergency strike by
public employees to one by private employees has an important addi-
tional advantage. Governmental intervention becomes neutral inter-
vention. The mayor is not a party to the dispute with the interest of
a party in the outcome. This is the case in two important respects.
First, the government need not seem to intervene as the adversary of
the union, the position it inevitably adopts when it is the employer.
Second, the appearance of neutrality gives political leaders more breath-
ing space vis-a-vis those constituents who are inconvenienced by the
strike and are clamoring for a settlement. When the government is the
employer, it appears to the public to have the power to settle imme-
diately. One step removed, it appears able to achieve a settlement only
by bringing two other parties together. The price of a service, more-
over, will reflect costs directly where a private employer is involved
and not be hidden in an unintelligible municipal budget. This in-
creased visibility of the costs of a settlement will also reduce the pres-
sure on political leaders to settle. Great pressure there will be, but of
a different order nevertheless.
Contracting out is not the sole alternative. We have discussed it as
if it were because our case is weakest where a function is merely
contracted out rather than shed entirely.
Contracting out suffers from the fact that some pressure will in-
evitably develop to increase the monetary size of the government con-
tract in order to settle a dispute. Although we believe that the pressure
on the budget will be less than if the government were the formal
employer, it may nevertheless be enough to skew the political process
undesirably. Shedding the function entirely solves that problem and
might, since the consumers of the services may be free to choose
among entrepreneurs, create a more competitive situation than would
occur under a contracting out scheme.
It may be argued, however, that the poor, having now to purchase
the service, will be penalized by such a solution. This does not follow.
26. See H. WnLL 'oGToN, supra note 12, at 269-297 (1968).
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The impact on the poor depends in part, of course, on the nature of
the shed service. It also depends on whether the excess sums public
employees would have extracted, if the government were the formal
employer, will not now benefit the poor either through direct sub-
sidies or improved municipal services. Moreover, the poor pay taxes
both directly (regressive sales taxes) and indirectly (property taxes
reflected in rent and increased costs of goods). In this role they are
interested in seeing municipal services obtained as cheaply as possible.
To the extent, however, that the poor are disadvantaged, the govern-
ment might subsidize the purchase of the service through vouchers to
eligible individuals or families, as many on both the political right and
left are now suggesting with regard to education. 27 During a strike,
there would, of course, be pressure on government to increase its sub-
sidy in order to permit the payment of higher wages. The visibility of
the cost of increasing the subsidy, however, is apt to be greater, and
thus arouse greater opposition, than that of merely changing a contract.
And if non-subsidized consumers can limit their purchase of the ser-
vice, a pressure to resist union demands will be generated."
Public employee unionism, therefore, is a force restraining expan-
sion of the role of government. Other considerations being equal, it is
a force requiring government to decline new functions or to shed those
it already has.
Under no circumstances, of course, will government shed its labor
problems by shedding functions. As a third party, government will
have a role to play in helping to resolve disputes. And try as it might
to shed functions or contract out, it must remain the employer in many,
many areas. What labor relations law should be in those areas requires
consideration of the function of strikes and investigation into whether
workable alternatives to the strike exist.
IV. The Strike and Its Alternatives
A. The Role of the Strike
We have argued that distortion of the political process is the major,
long-run social cost of strikes in public employment. The distortion
results from unions obtaining too much power, relative to other in-
terest groups, in decisions affecting the level of taxes and the allocation
27. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREED)OZA 85 et seq. (1962).
28. Refuse collection, again, is an example, for there may frequently be ways In which
individuals can dispose of their refuse other than by hiring a contractor.
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of tax dollars. This distortion may, therefore, result in a redistribution
of income by government, one in which union members are subsidized
at the expense of other interest groups. And, where non-monetary
issues, such as the decentralization of the governance of schools or the
creation of a civilian board to review police conduct, are resolved
through bargaining in which the strike or threat thereof is used, the
distortion of the political process is no less apparent.20
It has been earnestly argued, however, that if public employee unions
are successfully denied the strike, they will have too little relative
power.30 To unpack the claims in this argument is crucially important.
In the private sector collective bargaining depends upon the strike
threat and the occasional strike. It is how deals are made, how collec-
tive bargaining works, why employers agree to terms and conditions
of employment better than they originally offered. Intuition suggests
that what is true of the private sector also is true of the public.
Without the strike threat and the strike, the public employer will be
intransigent; and this intransigence will, in effect, deprive employees
of the very benefits unionization was intended to bring to them. Col-
lective bargaining, the argument goes, will be merely a facade for
"collective begging."
Initially, it must be noted that even in the absence of unionism and
bargaining the market imposes substantial limitations on the ability
of public employers to "take advantage" of their employees. Because
they must compete with private employers, and other units of govern-
ment as well, to hire workers, public employers cannot permit their
wages and conditions of employment to be relatively poorer than those
offered in the private sector and still get the needed workers. And,
as we noted in the Limits article, the fact that most public employees
work in areas in which there are numerous alternative employment
opportunities reduces the likelihood that many public employers are
monopsonists. Even if they are, moreover, the lack of a profit motive
reduces the likelihood that government's monopsony power, if it exists,
will be exercised.31
Much of the argument about the role of the strike is, in any event,
29. The unique aspects of non-monetary disputes are dealt with in a separate section
on scope of bargaining, pp. 852-70 infra. The discussion in this section will focus prin-
cipally on disputes over monetary issues.
s0. See, e.g., Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in PtrnuC EMPLOYEE OCA-
NIZATION AND BARGAINING 29 (H. Anderson ed. 1968); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employ-
ment, 67 MicH. L. R V. 931 (1969).
31. Limits at 1120-21.
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overstated. First, it exaggerates the power of the strike weapon in the
private sector. As we argued in the Limits article,82 the power of private
sector unions to gain comparative advantages, while real, is inherently
limited by what we there called the employment-benefit tradeoff.
Second, the very unionization of public employees creates a powerful
interest group, at least in large urban centers, that seems able to com-
pete very well with other groups in the political decision-making pro-
cess.33 Indeed, collective bargaining (the strike apart) is a method
of channeling and underscoring the demands of public employees that
is not systematically available to other groups. Public employee unions
frequently serve as lobbying agents wielding political power quite dis-
proportionate to the size of their membership. The failure of the Hart-
ford firefighters, mentioned earlier, to seek formal status as a bargain-
ing agent demonstrates how much punch such organizations can wield,
And where a strong local labor council exists, association with it can
significantly increase the power of public employee unions. This is
some assurance, therefore, that public employees, even if prohibited
from striking, will not be at a comparative disadvantage in bargaining
with their employers.
Thus, on the merits, when one takes the trouble to unpack its
claims, the argument for the strike in public employment is hardly in-
exorable. But the merits are only part of reality. The attitudes and
convictions of public employees and their leaders cannot be put aside.
There simply cannot be an effective ban on strikes if public employees
believe that they are being treated in a relatively unfair fashion, un-
less, perhaps, we were prepared to accept the consequences of a major
political crisis in which the ultimate coercive power of the state were
used on a large scale against its own employees.
If this analysis is correct, a major problem for those designing legis-
lation for labor relations in the public sector is to create institutions
capable of achieving a high degree of acceptability. Because most men
are greedy and few are deterred by legal norms which, while wise, are
hard to explain, nothing may prove wholly effective in the quest to
eliminate public employee strikes. If this proves to be the case, the mu-
nicipal employer will have to be made less vulnerable to the strike.
32. Id. at 1117-19.
33. Thus, for example, in San Francisco municipal employees did very well without
the strike, and indeed, without real collective bargaining for many years. And In New
Haven, collective bargaining worked well without the strike or strike threat. In both
cities the unions were skillful participants in the political process. Cf. R. DASIL, %W0
GovERas 253-55 (1961).
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At any rate, one thing seems sure. Absent institutional arrangements
more or less acceptable to all the parties, some strikes are inevitable
when collective bargaining leads to an impasse. We now turn to a dis-
cussion of arrangements which, while they prohibit strikes, provide
mechanisms to temper the impact of the prohibition.
B. The Illegal Strike Model
1. Post-Impasse Procedures Without a Final Settlement
Mechanism
While in Vermont it appears to be legal for municipal employees to
strike unless to do so "will endanger the health, safety or welfare of the
public," and in some other states, such as Michigan, it may prove to be
difficult to obtain an injunction against an illegal strike, most states
that have addressed the question through legislative act or judicial
decision do impose a legal prohibition, backed by the injunctive rem-
edy, on strikes by public employees.34 A number of states that have
enacted comprehensive statutes providing for collective bargaining in
the public sector, moreover, have developed institutions aimed at
making the strike ban effective.
35
a. The Nature of Fact-Finding with Recommendations
Many statutes provide for fact-finding with recommendations or its
virtual equivalent, advisory arbitration, when an impasse exists after
both bargaining and mediation.30 Considerable discussion of these
post-impasse procedures has appeared lately in the learned journals,
and an issue with jurisprudential pretensions has surfaced a7 What
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1968). MmIi. Com.'. Lus ANt. §§ 423.201-.254
(1967), and see Holland School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 156 N.W,2d
206 (1968). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.51 (1966); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 34:13 A-1 to 34:13 A-9 as amended (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. Crv. SEa. IAW § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1969), Wis. STAT. § l11.70(4)(2) (lt69). The
legislature of Hawaii passed a statute (which has not yet been signed by the Governor)
on May 6, 1970, making strikes by public employees legal in certain circumstances. See
349 BNA GovT. Em'T. RE.. REP. F-1 to 9 (Nay 18, 1970) [hereinafter cited as GERA].
35. See,e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1968); Mo. RE%'. STAT.
§§ 105-500-.530 (Supp. 1968); R-I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 28-9.4-1 to -19 (1968); WAsH. REv.
CODE § 41.56.010-.900 (Supp. 1967).
36. See, e.g., CONN. GaN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7467 to 478 (Supp. 1969); Mass. AN,,N. LAWS
ch. 149, § 178D (1965), §§ 178F-N (Supp. 1969); MIc. CoMp. LAivS ANN. §§ 423.201-254
(1967); N.Y. Civ. Sav. LAws §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1969); Wis, STAT. § 111.70, and
§§ 111.80-.94 (1969).
37. See, e.g., McKelvey, Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise or Illu-
sion? 22 IND. & LAB. Rr. Rmv. 528 (1969); Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact
Finding and Arbitration, 55 A.B.A.J. 835 (1969); Stem, The Wisconsin Public Employee
Fact Finding Procedure 20 INo. & LAB. REL REv. 3 (1966); Schmidt, Observations on the
Process of Fact-Finding in Michigan Public Education Teacher-School Board Contract
Disputes, in PUBLIC EM LOYEE ORGANI7ATION AND BARGAINING 81 (L Anderson ed. 1968);
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should fact-finding with recommendations be? Should it be adjudica-
tion or adjustment, a judicial process or super-mediation? Although
these questions are best dealt with in terms of the goals to be achieved
by the procedures, some initial misconceptions generated by the man-
ner in which the questions are put must be cleared away.
To ask whether fact-finding with recommendations should be viewed
as adjudication through a judicial proceeding, is to suggest that fact-
finding with recommendations can approximate a typical case in a
court of law. It cannot, and for fundamental reasons rooted in the
nature of the judicial process. Courts generally decide disputes over
rights and obligations in terms of standards knowable to the parties at
the time the dispute arose. While this may not mean that there is
only one correct resolution of any dispute, it does mean that judges
generally have limited discretion in the decision-making process,
Only in a Pickwickian mood would one suggest that a post-impasse
tribunal must decide a dispute over rights and obligations in terms
of standards knowable to the parties at the time the dispute arose. The
issues before such a tribunal are so much more fluid in terms of de-
cisional standards as to be of a totally different order from those faced
by judges. The legitimate discretion of the decision-maker is enormous
relative to that generally accorded judges. Absent limiting authorita-
tive instructions-a statute or agreement of the parties-the boundaries
of that discretion are fixed by the goals of the procedure: namely, a
resolution acceptable to all the parties, including the governmental
entity with de facto control of the budget.
The question of what is an acceptable result depends, of course,
upon a variety of factors. And there are a number of related ways to
view these factors. One is to look at the power configuration within a
municipality. Consider what may be the hardest case, namely, where the
governmental unit which negotiates does not have effective political
control of the budget. If the final budgetary authority88-the city legis-
lative body-is not the governmental branch which negotiates--the
executive-there is a high probability of contract rejection when the
Howlett, Arbitration in the Public Sector, in SouTHWFSTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 11ThI
ANN. INST. ON LABOR LAW, LABOR LAw DEvELoPMENTs 1969, at 231, 249; Anderson, The
Use of Fact Finding in Dispute Settlement, paper delivered before National Academy of
Arbitrators (Jan. 31, 1969).
38. The final budgetary authority is not necessarily the legislature: "Where the legls.
lative body is the town meetings, approval of the [collective bargaining] agreement by a
majority of the selectmen shall make the agreement valid and binding upon the town and
the board of finance shall appropriate or provide whatever funds are necessary to comply
with such collective bargaining agreement." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 7-474(b) (Supp, 1969).
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(c) (Supp. 1969).
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union's politcial power is substantially less vis-&-vis the legislative body
than the executive.
If a post-impasse tribunal's processes are invoked after rejection of
a contract by the legislature, the central fact the tribunal must deter-
mine, for it to function effectively, is the existence of the political
situation we have hypothesized. The tribunal's principal task is to help
work out an agreement acceptable to union, executive and legislature.
This task does not entail a disinterested and principled quest for
"truth"--beyond an accurate assessment of political forces-unless
that is thought to be the best tactic for gaining acceptability." Accom-
.modation among the disputants, not the principled application of pre-
existing standards, is the goal. The job of the post-impasse tribunal
is to protect the public from a strike by achieving a compromise, and
that may mean recommending that employees earn more than the
tribunal believes they are "worth" by other arguably relevant stan-
dards. Maximizing long-run public welfare in the sense of finding
what the services are "worth" or what settlement is "fair"-by looking
to the demand for, or supply of, labor or to comparable private sector
wages, for instance-is not the job of the post-impasse tribunal. In-
deed, the tribunal's quest is always inconsistent with maximizing pub-
lic welfare in that sense, except for the case in which the balance of
political forces fortuitiously leads to a result consistent with it.
A second way to approach the question of what factors make a re-
sult acceptable is to attend to the institutional arrangements, rather
than to the power relationships, that exist in a particular situation. A
post-impasse tribunal's role must vary according to whether law or
practice makes it difficult for the union to by-pass one branch of the
public employer, the executive for instance, and "bargain" with
another, the legislative body. For where a union is able to choose its
ultimate bargaining partner, the post-impasse tribunal may find either
itself bypassed or its position undermined. Close attention to munici-
pal practice makes clear that experiences vary enormously, but that the
by-pass problem is very often significant.40
Finally, but without any suggestion that the subject has been ex-
hausted, the factors affecting the acceptability of a post-impasse tribu-
nal's recommendation may be illustrated by asking whom the tribunal
39. Compare Marshall, Report #29, City of Watertown v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Local 695 (July 20. 1964), quoted in Anderson, supra note 37, at 15.
40. See generally Wender, Fragmentation of Authority for Collective Bargaining at the
Local Level (1969), (unpublished senior studies paper on file in Yale Law Librar)).
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is trying to influence. Several possibilities, of which the following are
examples, suggest themselves: 1) Where those negotiating for the pub-
lic employer have effective political control over its budget, recom-
mendations serve functions similar to recommendations of post-im-
passe tribunals in the private sector. They may aid the parties by
fashioning inventive solutions to the impasse, or they may crystallize
public opinion and thus exert pressure toward a negotiated settlement
growing out of the recommendations. 41 2) In the more usual situation,
where there is some effective review by a budgetary authority, recom-
mendations may serve the additional function of influencing that
authority directly through the persuasiveness and prestige of the tribu-
nal, and indirectly through public opinion.
Having discussed the theory of fact-finding with recommendations,
we now turn to an examination of its procedures in the practice of
some states that employ it.
b. Fact-Finding Procedures
The states are truly chambers of experimentation in the field of
public employment and collective bargaining. Fact-finding with recom-
mendations, however, is something of an exception, since the vari-
ations which exist are generally matters of procedural detail rather
than fundamental structure. These differences exist with respect to
such questions as who may invoke the post-impasse procedure and at
what point in time; how is the tribunal chosen and who pays for its
services; and finally, what is the official state attitude toward mediation
by the fact-finders?
If, as we have argued, the goal of these procedures is achieving a
settlement acceptable to all the parties, and if achieving this depends
upon the several factors we have showcased, considerable flexibility
should be built into any statutory scheme. There is, however, a con-
sideration that places some limits on the degree of permissible flexi-
bility. The post-impasse procedure should not hinder collective bar-
gaining. The major hope for avoiding strikes in the public sector is
not the post-impasse procedure, but the bargaining process; not the
resolution of impasses, but their avoidance. Resort to post-impasse
procedures, therefore, ought not be so automatic as to become a rou-
tine step in the process of reaching a settlement. For if it does,
41. See WVELLINGTON, supra note 12, at 284-85 (1968).
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serious bargaining may be deferred until the procedures are invoked,
and impasses will also become routine.
It should, therefore, be relatively difficult for the parties to obtain
the services of a post-impasse tribunal, and those services should be
relatively expensive-but only relatively, because the overriding aim
is to avoid the strike, not to limit the role of outside intervention.
When it can help, the post-impasse tribunal should not be priced out
of the market, nor should the parties, for other reasons, fail to use it.
Limiting the chilling effect of fact-finding with recommendations is
attempted in several states by vesting an agency with the task of de-
termining, prior to the selection of the post-impasse tribunal, whether
a bona fide impasse exists. The agency is normally provided with some
criteria as to what constitutes an impasse. In Connecticut, for example,
the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, upon receipt of a peti-
tion requesting fact-finding from either a municipal employer, a union,
or both, must investigate and determine whether a "dispute [exists
between the parties] ... after a reasonable period of negotiation over
the terms of an agreement" or whether "no agreement has been
reached within a reasonable period of time prior to the final date for
setting the municipal budget . . . . 4 The Massachusetts statute is
virtually identical, and the Wisconsin provisions similar.4"
In New York, an impasse is defined in terms of the budget sub-
mission date-"an impasse may be deemed to exist if the parties fail
to achieve agreement at least sixty days prior to the budget submission
date of the public employer."45 The Public Employment Relations
Board performs much the same screening function under the New
York statute as does the Board of Mediation and Arbitration in Con-
necticut. There are some nuances in the New York statute, however.
First, the Board, without the request of the parties, may initiate the
post-impasse procedure. This seems desirable, for there may be situ-
ations where neither party will want to petition the Board. On the
other hand, a second aspect of the New York statute seems undesirable.
42. This phenomenon has occurred in some teacher-school board negotiations in Con-
necticut. The Connecticut Teacher Negotiation Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153(a),
(e), (g) (1958), §§ 10-153(b)-(d), (f) (Supp. 1969), provides for mediation after an impasse,
and then for advisory arbitration. In some cases the parties defer serious bargaining be-
cause they anticipate arbitration, and fear the effect of serious bargaining, with the com-
promises it entails, on their success in arbitration.
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7473(a), (Supp. 1969).
44. Mass. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178F(7), as amended (Supp. 1969); WTs. STAT. § 111.70(4)(e)
and (@ (1969) (municipal employees); Wis. STAT. § 111.88 (1969) (state employees).
45. N.Y. Ctv. Sntv. LAW § 209, I (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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Because the confidence of the parties in the post-impasse tribunal may
be necessary for it to function successfully, the parties should partici-
pate in the selection of its membership. This is not in terms provided
for in New York, but it is in a number of other states. 40 The New York
statute, however, does explicitly invite the parties to develop through
contract their own post-impasse procedures.41 If there is any truth in
the widespread belief that people have more confidence in their own
handiwork than in that of others, this explicit invitation makes sense.
But there would seem to be no prohibition on contractual arrange-
ments of the type encouraged by New York in those states that are
silent on the issue.
Several states deal with the problem of compensation for post-im-
passe fact-finding with recommendations. 8 As we noted, the problem
is to make the process expensive enough to encourage settlement with-
out its use, but not so expensive that it will not be invoked when it
might prove helpful. A favored solution is to tax the parties equally
for the service and to have the fees set by the agency charged with
administering the post-impasse procedure.
49
Several states also deal wisely with the mediation function of the
post-impasse tribunal.50 Recognizing that the goal of the procedure is
to achieve a successful resolution of the dispute, they make it clear
that the fact-finders are free to mediate.51 Mediation is not a wise
strategy in every situation, but it often can be very helpful. Attempts
to separate the fact finding-recommendation procedure from medi-
ation, as in Michigan, seem misguided. 2
46. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-473(b) (Supp. 1969).
47. N.Y. Civ. Stv. LAw § 209, $ 2 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
48. In Connecticut, for example, the memorandum on Fact Finding Procedure, pro.
mulgated by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration provides: "The cost of fact
finding, including fees and expenses, will be shared equally by the parties .... The fee
schedule for days in which a fact finder conducts hearings or devotes to the study, and
preparation of his report is as follows: for cities with a population under 15,000, $100
per day; for cities of 15,000 to 50,000, $125 per day; and for cities of over 50,000, $150
per day .... Expenses incurred by the fact finder such as travel, rental of hearing rooms,
and other necessary expenses will also be paid by the parties." Fact Finding Procedure
8 (March, 1967).
49. See, e.g., Massachusetts Rules for Fact Finding, Rule 25, promulgated by the Board
of Conciliation and Arbitration (April 3, 1968), reprinted in 4 LAB. REL. REP. 31 S.LL,
250(g) (1968).
50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473(o (Supp. 1969); Wig, STAT. § 111,88(3)
(1969).
51. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178J(f), as amended (Supp. 1969). It would seem that
in those situations where the parties are unable to reach agreement on monetary Issues,
they have a tendency to postpone to the post-impasse stage the resolution of non.monetary
issues. Mediation at this point is often helpful in clearing up a number of these un-
resolved issues.
52. The Chairman of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board has stated that Board's
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c. The Effects of Fact-Finding
The most interesting and sophisticated studies of the effects of fact-
finding with recommendations come from researchers at the Institute
of Industrial Relations at the University of Wisconsin.5 These studies
evaluated post-impasse procedures in terms of what happens to dis-
putes that go to fact-finding, whether it reduces strikes, how the par-
ties view the process, and whether the process is over-employed and
does deter collective bargaining. These studies suggest-and others"
elsewhere tend to confirm-that fact finding is generally successful.
While any evaluation is difficult because one does not know what
would have happened absent the existence or employment of the post-
impasse procedure, the evidence shows that many disputes are resolved
without the issuance of formal recommendations; that recommen-
dations usually are accepted; that while there are strikes after recom-
mendations, they are few; that in most jurisdictions the parties do not
resort to fact-finding with too great frequency; and that, by and large,
the parties regard these impasse tribunals as helpful. 5 Criticism exists,
to be sure. Non-finality, post-impasse tribunals are no panacea, but
expectations realistically set have not been disappointed.
2. Post-Impasse Procedures which Provide for Final
Settlements
a. Binding Arbitration: Effectiveness
Compulsory and binding arbitration is no panacea either. It does
not prevent all work stoppages; witness the recent police strike in
Montreal.56 And it cannot help but chill, to some extent at least, the
bargaining process. The nature of these difficulties with compulsory
and binding arbitration often is not fully understood by lawyer or
layman.
view that mediation and fact-finding should be separated. "In 1968, we instructed our
fact finders to be judges, not mediators. We do not rule out an 'in chambers' settlement
if it appears possible. In August/September, 1968, our fact finders, particularly those with
collective bargaining experience, were not always obedient to our instructions. They pre-
ferred to mediate. Some of the bargaining teams preferred it that way." Howlectt, supra
note 37, at 249.
53. See E. Krinsky, An Analysis of Fact Finding as a Procedure for the Settlement of
Labor Disputes Involving Public Employees (unpublished 1969); Stem, The Wisconsin
Public Employee Fact Finding Procedure, 20 InD. & Lw. RL.t REv. 3 (1966).
54. See McKelvey, supra note 37, at 531-534.
55. See Krinsky, supra note 37; Anderson, The Uses of Fact Finding in Dispute Settle-
ment 8-11 (paper delivered to National Academy of Arbitrators, Jan. 31, 1969).
56. The October, 1969 strike of policemen and firemen in Montreal followed a binding
arbitration award granting a substantial wage increase, but declining an increase that
would establish parity with Toronto. Such parity has long been a goal of the police and
firefighters' organizations in Montreal. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1969, at 3, coL 1.
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Compulsory and binding arbitration seeks to prevent strikes in two
ways, neither of which is completely successful. First, it attempts to
enforce a settlement by application of legal sanctions. Ordinarily, this
will be enough for all but the aberrational case. And the occasional
strikes which still occur sometimes may be prevented if the law re-
sponds with very harsh penalties. Such penalties, however, often do not
have the support of the community and may stir a feeling of revulsion.
In those circumstances, they are unlikely to be effective,"1 and, in any
event, workers willing to accept such penalties can still make a strike
effective. Legal sanctions, therefore, do not provide total protection.
Compulsory and binding arbitration, however, seeks to prevent
strikes in a second way. Because the strike in private employment is
viewed by many as a fundamental right located well within the foot-
hills of the Constitution,"8 there is, in some places, a corresponding
sense that laws against strikes in the public sector are unfair.5 This
attitude-which survives in a fierce state of tension with counter atti-
tudes60-makes bold public employees to break the law.01 A procedure
which offers public employees a seemingly fair alternative to the
strike, however, may change the community's sense of the propriety of
the strike, and may in the long run influence the attitude of public
employees. They may in time reach that desirable state of accepting
57. The history of the Condon-Wadlin Law, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 891 f19-17]
N.Y. LAws 842, as amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702 (19631 N.Y. LAWAS 2482 (re-
pealed 1967), is the classic example. The statute required automatic dismissal of striking
employees, and a three year ban on higher pay for any rehired striker, plus a five year
probationary period. In many situations it not only failed to deter strikes, but was too
harsh to be enforced. See Montana, Striking Teachers, Welfare, Transit, and Sanitation
Workers, 19 LAB. L.J. 273 (1968).
58. The principle is expressed, for example, in § 13 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964): "Nothing in this subchapter except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or implcde or diminish In any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
59. "Ultimately, laws depend for their effectiveness upon voluntary acceptance by the
vast majority of the decent persons in the groups regulated. Without such acceptance, the
police and the courts are powerless to uphold the law, as our experience with prohibition
proved. We see another demonstration of this truth when the words on the statute books
were defied by a highly respectable, normally law-abiding group-public school teachers,
In my view, the teachers were basically right. The law should not forbid them to strike
merely because they are public employees." St. Antoine, Public Employees and Strikes,
13 Micir. L. QUADRANGLE 13, 19 (1969).
60. The "counter attitude" is dramatically reflected in the laws of the states, par-
ticularly those states where organized labor is strong and where collective bargaining for
municipal employees has been established.
61. "There is a readily discernible, sharply upward trend in the number of strikes in
Government employment over the last decade and in the number of employees Involved.
From a total of only 15 strikes involving 1,700 workers in 1958, the numbers have grown
to 254 strikes of 202,000 employees in 1968 .... Preliminary figures for 1969 and estimates
for the current year indicate the trend continues unabated." TwErriErn CeNTuPY FuND,
Pic=ETs AT Crry HALL 31 (1970).
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an award that they find less than totally fair. This is the goal of com-
pulsory arbitration, and what differentiates it from non-finality proce-
dures. There is no moral imperative, above and beyond the preexisting
moral imperative of not breaking the no-strike law, generated by non-
finality procedures such as fact-finding with recommendations. They
are advisory only. An aim of arbitration, binding on both parties, is to
generate just such an imperative. Again, however, total success cannot
be expected.
The second factor limiting the effectiveness of arbitration is that it
deters collective bargaining. The point is simple enough. Either the
public employer or the union will reckon that an arbitration award
will be more advantageous than a negotiated settlement. That party
will then employ tactics to ensure arbitration by bargaining without a
sincere desire to reach agreement.
2
It is almost impossible wholly to solve this problem; but the route
to partial and perhaps satisfactory resolution is to fashion a procedure
sufficiently diverse and uncertain so as to make a negotiated settlement
more attractive to the parties than arbitration.
The composition of an arbitration panel can importantly influence
its award. Honest men acting disinterestedly often see things differ-
ently. The behaviorists are surely right in thinking that results are in-
fluenced by the perspectives of decisionmakers. Thus, to the extent
that the composition of an arbitration panel is unknown beforehand
and is outside the control of the parties, some uncertainty will exist.
On the other hand, the parties are more likely to have confidence in
an award rendered by arbitrators they have chosen. This tension can
be eased by allowing each party to select one member of a three-man
panel.
Another device to reduce the chilling effect is "one-or-the-other"
arbitration, in which the arbitrator's choice would be limited to either
the employer's final position or the union's final position-all of one
or all of the other. 3 This creates some uncertainty but very high stakes,
and the fact that the stakes are so high is counted on by its advocates
to make "one-or-the-other" arbitration work. The predictions made
are as follows: Employer and union, realizing that the arbitrator's
power is limited to accepting the entire proposed contract of one or
62. The problem is discussed in more detail in WNV.Ncro v, supra note 12, at 288-91.
63. See Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining, 5 INo. REL.,
Feb. 1966, at 58, 45. The President has proposed a form of one-or-.the:otlier arbitration
in national transportation disputes. See 73 LAB. Rr'- RE.P. 197 (March 9, 1970).
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the other party, will each bargain in good faith and in great earnest-
ness to reach an agreement. If this process fails to produce agreement,
it will, nevertheless, narrow very substantially the area of disagree-
ment. The parties' final proposals, moreover, may further narrow dis-
agreements as each party strains for a favorable decision from the
arbitrators by attempting to make its position appear the more reason-
able of the two.
4
One-or-the-other arbitration has, however, substantive difficulties
which suggest that it may work better in some disputes than in
others.65 If the parties assume positions out of ideological commitment
rather than practical needs, the original disagreement may not be nar-
rowed in the bargaining process by the all or nothing nature of pos-
sible arbitration.6r The arbitrators, moreover, may occasionally not
know what the effects of certain proposals would be. There is some-
times the danger of the seemingly more reasonable proposal being
disruptive or otherwise impracticable. This may be an aggravated dif-
ficulty in the public sector where the complexity of municipal fiscal
affairs or the heated political atmosphere surrounding particular non-
monetary issues obscure the stakes in the dispute.
b. Binding Arbitration: Legal Considerations
The major legal threat-and puny it is-to compulsory and binding
arbitration is the doctrine of illegal delegation. The constitution of
each state gives legislative power to the legislature. The question is, to
what extent can the legislature delegate that power? Of course, it can
delegate power over the wages and conditions of employment of mu-
nicipal employees to municipal legislatures. If collective bargaining
is legal in a state, the further delegation required by collective bar-
gaining is legal. But the legislative body may exercise some continuing
control. In Connecticut, for example, bargaining is between the execu-
tive and the employee representative, but the legislative body (the City
64. With the agreement of the parties, one-or-the-other arbitration was used In a
teacher-board of education dispute in Connecticut. The parties came to advisory arbitra.
tion after serious good faith bargaining which had substantially narrowed the differences
between them. The one-or-the-other suggestion, after it wvas explained to the partie ind
agreed to by them, led to several hours of bargaining that almost resulted In a contract.
65. Some insight into people's attitudes toward arbitration may be gleaned from their
reactions to one-or-the-other arbitration. Perhaps it is because so many see arbitration
as "adding up the claims on both sides of a dispute and dividing the sum by two," Local
28, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Maryland Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 191
F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Md. 1961), that their first reaction to the one-or-the-other varlety 1s
to call it a game of Russian roulette.
66. This is more of a problem in the public sector than it is in the private. See the
discussion on scope of bargaining, pp. 852-70 infra.
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Council or the Board of Aldermen) must approve or disapprove in toto
any contract negotiated by these parties with budgetary consequences.0 7
Binding arbitration, however, if it means anything, means that it
binds the legislative body as well as the executive and the employee
representative; and this, it might be thought, could pose difficulties.
As it has evolved, the delegation doctrine, at least in most jurisdic-
tions, is satisfied if there is a rational reason for the delegation, and
if power is given to a state official who is directed to exercise it
according to decisional standards supplied by the legislature. 3 This is
probably too loose a formulation to satisfy the requirements for a
legal delegation in any particular jurisdiction, but it should make
clear that a legislature can, if it is careful, draft a binding arbitration
statute and be reasonably confident that the statute will be held consti-
tutional.
The most illuminating case addressing the constitutionality of bind-
ing arbitration involves a Rhode Island statute giving the right of
collective bargaining to firefighters, and providing:
In the event that the bargaining agent and the corporate au-
thorities are unable, within 30 days... to reach an agreement...
all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration. c0
Each party is given the responsibility of selecting an arbitrator; the
two arbitrators selected are themselves to choose a third, who serves
as chairman of the panel.70
This method of selecting the arbitration panel raises more legal
difficulties than would other approaches. It makes it harder for a court
to find that the arbitrators are state officials than would, for example,
a statute that empowered the Governor to appoint a standing panel of
fifteen or twenty men from which a three-man arbitration board was
chosen by the parties for a particular case. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, moved surely to its holding that the arbitrators were
state officials and that the three-man panel was a state agency. Said the
Court:
We find that the legislature delegated to each of the ar-
67. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474 (Supp. 1969).
68. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I.
1969); Colkctive Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the
Public Sector, 68 Mica. L. Rv. 260, 279-288 (1969).
69. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7 (1968).
70. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-8 (Supp. 1969). The case is City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969).
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bitrators a portion of the sovereign and legislative power of the
government, particularly the power to fix the salaries of public
employees, clearly a legislative function. It is clear that each ar-
bitrator is free to perform this duty without control or supervision
from any superior. It is also to be observed that the provisions...
of the act establish a fixed term and specific duties for the incun-
bent. It is our conclusion then that an arbitrator appointed under
the pertinent provisions of the statute is a public officer and that
collectively the three constitute a public board or agency.71
The Court also had no trouble, under the Rhode Island statute, with
the question of decisional standards. "In the instant case," the Court
said, "the legislature prescribed standards for the exercise of the dele-
gated power that clearly are reasonably open to the conclusion that
the exercise of power by the arbitrators would be sufficiently confined
to meet the constitutional requirements"7 2 The statute, as the Court
tells us,
sets out specifically a number of comprehensive limitations on the
actions of a board of arbitrators when exercising the power dele-
gated. They require that certain factors ".... . be given weight by
the arbitrators in arriving at a decision ...." These factors include
specifically a comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions of
employment of the fire department in question with prevailing
wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled em-
ployees of the building trades and industry in the local operating
area. They require also that consideration and weight be given
to the wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of the fire
department in question in comparison to similar wage rates or
hourly conditions of employment of other cities or towns of com-
parable size. They require that weight be given to the interest and
welfare of the public and specifically spell out that weight be
given to the hazards of the employment and physical and educa-
tion qualifications of the job training and skills. In our opinion,
these standards clearly are sufficient to meet the constitutional re-
quirement that the delegated power be confined by reasonable
norms or standards.3
Other states are experimenting with compulsory and binding ar-
bitration in portions of the public sector, but experience remains
limited. Michigan has a Police and Firemen's Arbitration Act which
became effective on October 1, 1969, and is due to expire June 30,
71. 256 A.2d at 210-211.
'72. Id. at 211.
73. Id.
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l972.74 Decisional standards to be used "as applicable," are spelled out
in some detail in the Michigan law. 5 In contrast the Pennsylvania
Police and Firemen Arbitration Act contains no standards, other than
the general policy of the statute, to guide the arbitrators.70 While this
does not violate the delegation doctrine as it has evolved in Pennsyl-
vania,77 it probably would subject a similarly drafted statute to consti-
tutional attack in a number of jurisdictions.78
c. Legislative Finality
A very different approach to the impasse problem is suggested in
the Taylor Committee Report which led to the enactment of New
York's Public Employees' Fair Employment Law. The Taylor Com-
mittee suggested, "that in the event of the rejection of a fact-finding
recommendation, the legislative body or committee hold a form of
'show cause hearing' at which the parties review their positions with
respect to the recommendations of the fact-finding board. The appro-
priate budgetary allotment or other regulations are then to be enacted
by the legislative body.
79
The statute as initially enacted did not adopt this proposal, but a
1969 amendment provides:
74. Mica. ComP. Aws ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (Supp. 1970).
75. They indude:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of
government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees
involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees performing similar services and with other em-
ployees generally:
(1) In public employment in comparable communities.
(2) In private emplo)ment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as the
cost of living.
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, including direct
wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other excused tine, insurance and
pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of
employment, and all other benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the
arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or tradi-
tionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and
conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation,
fact-finding, arbitration or othervise between the parties, in the public service
or in private employment.
Id. at 425.239.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4S, §§ 217.1-.12 (Supp. 1969).
77. Harvey v. Russo, 435 Pa. 18, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
78. See generally, K. Davis, AD.INISmRATE LAw T.ATiSE § 2.15 (1958).
79. New York Governors Committee on Public Employee Relations, Final Report 89
(1966).
837
The Yale Law Journal
In the event that either the public employer or the employee
organization does not accept in whole or in part the recommenda-
tions of the fact-finding board, (i) the chief executive officer of
the government involved, shall within ten days after receipt of the
findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding board,
submit to the legislative body of the government involved a copy
of the findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding
board, together with his recommendations for settling the dispute;
(ii) the employee organization may submit to such legislative body
its recommendations for settling the dispute; (iii) the legislative
body or a duly authorized committee thereof shall forthwith con-
duct a hearing at which the parties shall be required to explain
their positions with respect to the report of the fact-finding board;
and (iv) thereafter, the legislative body shall take such action as
it deems to be in the public interest, including the interest of the
public employees involved.80
One difficulty with this legislative finality approach is that in some
situations the employer ("chief executive officer of the government
involved") and "the legislative body of the government involved" may
in fact be the same-a school board with independent fiscal authority,
for example. In other situations it may be that "the legislative body of
the government involved" has already acted, indeed has precipitated
the crisis by turning down a collective agreement. This could certainly
happen in Connecticut if the legislative finality approach were ap.
pended to that state's municipal bargaining law.
Another troublesome question is whether it is desirable for the
legislature to deal in detail with labor relations. This varies, to be sure,
from legislative body to legislative body and also with the nature of
a particular labor dispute. But the long-run fear must be that public
employee unions will by-pass the executive, the public employer, when-
ever they think they can do better with the legislature. This is a
serious problem today in many municipalities that are developing
collective bargaining relationships with their employees. The legisla-
tive finality proposal, if widely adopted, could exacerbate this unhappy
state of affairs.
d. Choice of Procedures
None of the difficulties with legislative finality, however, requires its
total rejection. For if it were part of a choice-of-procedures statute-
one that permitted a choice among a number of post-impasse proce-
80. N.Y. Crv. Stow. LAw § 209, 3(e) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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dures-it could be employed selectively. It would not be used where
the legislature had already spoken. And, because it would be used only
from time to time, it would not aggravate the by-pass problem; at least
not very much.
The choice-of-procedures approach--an oldish idea in the area of
emergency disputes in the private sector81--has two major advantages.
First, it tailors the post-impasse procedure to the particular dispute.
The difficulty we noted with one-or-the-other arbitration is a good ex-
ample. If it is true that one-or-the-other is suited only to some situations,
the technique of selective application would seem desirable.
The second major advantage of a choice-of-procedures is that it
builds uncertainty into the post-impasse stage and thereby makes it
difficult for the parties to estimate the consequences of failing to agree.
Because neither party is likely to find every procedure favorable to
achieving its demands, the fear that the least desirable may be chosen
will itself generate settlement pressures.' -
Under such an approach, the agency charged with enforcing the
state public employee law would be empowered, after investigation,
to determine the procedure best suited to the particular dispute, be it
fact-finding with recommendations, regular arbitration, the one-or-the-
other variety or legislative finality. This breadth of choice should be
sufficient both to create uncertainty and to permit choice of an ap-
propriate procedure.
A choice of procedures approach, like every other approach consistent
with an open society, is no panacea. It will not stop all strikes, but it
has the best chance of reducing their incidence. And that is all we have
any right to expect.
3. Penalties for Striking
In a system of labor relations that bans the strike, the proper role
of sanctions is no less vexing a problem than the proper design for
post-impasse procedures. Only the outer boundaries of the problem are
reasonably clear. The command that the strike be illegal must be more
than hortatory, and the sanctions for breach of the primary rule must
not be so harsh as to engender a feeling of revulsion in the community.
81. See, e.g., Wirtz, The "Choice-of-Procedures" Approach to National Emergency Dis-
putes, in E6mRGENcY Dxsrtms ANI) NATIONAL POLICY 149 (1. Bernstein, H. Enarson, P.
Fleming, eds., 1955); Shultz, The Massachusetts Choice-of-Procedures Approach to Emer-
gency Disputes, 10 IND. & lAB. RE.L. REV. 359 (1957); A. Cox, LAw A D TIE NATIONAL .AOR
Poucy 55-58 (1960).
82. Wirtz, supra note 81, at 158-59.
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Within these boundaries the aim of sanctions is to deter strikes effec-
tively and to do justice. At best, this is a complicated business. Not
only is there the response of the general community; there is also the
response of the public employees involved. In some situations, for
example, the incarceration of a union leader for contempt will turn
that leader into a martyr and stiffen support for the strike. Yet it is
also true that fairness or justice requires that like situations be treated
alike. And it may be difficult to show forebearance toward one union
leader and incarcerate another.
Harsh penalties automatically invoked, moreover, run the risk of
converting an economic strike into a strike for amnesty which will be
difficult to settle without openly abandoning the law. The harsher the
penalties, the less the strikers will feel they have to lose, and the effect
may be to extend rather than end the strike. These considerations
suggest gradually escalating sanctions which seek to make the cost of
continuing the strike at any point in time greater than the cost of
ending it.
Other problems exist as well. To what extent should sanctions be
directed against the organization, its leaders, or its members? The an-
swer to this question may be influenced by what has come to be known
as the ratification problem; i.e., the increasing frequency with which
union members turn down negotiated settlements.8 3 This is a mani-
festation of rank and file militancy which overrides the union leader-
ship, and, where it exists, the threat of sanctions against the membership
may be necessary if strikes are to be reduced. This threat, indeed, may
be essential to any attempt by the leadership to assert control.
Different sanctions, of course, are appropriate to different situations.
This argues for flexibility, but with some guidelines.
Many states use the courts to develop sanctions. In the Holland case,
the Michigan Supreme Court suggested that a trial court "inquire into
whether the public employer has refused to bargain in good faith,
whether an injunction should be issued at all, and if so, on what terms
and for what period in light of the whole record to be adduced."8 '
Apart from the issue of good faith, it is far from clear what the
Michigan court would have a trial court examine. It may be that the
83. One classic example is the airline strike of 1966. President Johnson announccd a
settlement on television between five major carriers and the International Association of
Machinists only to have the union membership repudiate it the next day. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1966, at 1, cols. 5 and 8. Another example is the railroad-shopcraft dispute
of this year. See, e.g., 73 LAB. REL.. REP. 297 (April 13, 1970).
84. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968).
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process of "litigating elucidation" is a good way to develop differen-
tiated sanctions for different situations, but it requires considerable
wisdom on the part of judges. For if like cases are not treated alike,
the system is unfair and probably unworkable. There is no reason to
think that judge-created sanctions will be as, or more, effective than
those prescribed by the legislature. The imprimatur of the political
process may be necessary to the creation of a moral imperative against
striking, or to the dissipation of the belief that stern sanctions for
striking are inconsistent with our notions about fundamental freedoms.
One differentiating factor of importance is the procedures that have
been employed prior to the strike. Those procedures which seek to
substitute for the strike a fair method of dispute resolution must them-
selves be protected. For example, a strike in the teeth of a binding
arbitration award should be met with the maximum of sternness con-
sistent with the community's sense of fairness. Yet the Michigan Police
and Firemen Arbitration Act seems to undercut its policy of limited,
binding arbitration. The statute provides, "[n]o person shall be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment for any violation of the provisions
of this act or an order of the arbitration panel." The statute does
provide, however, that if a party "willfully disobeys a lawful order of
enforcement [of an award by a court] or willfully encourages or offers
resistance to such order ... the punishment for each day that such
contempt persists, may be a fine fixed in the discretion of the court
in an amount not to exceed $250.00 per day."85
There is considerable diversity as to sanctions among other states
with public employee bargaining statutes. Connecticut's Municipal
Employee Relations Act is silent except to provide that "[n]othing
[in this Act] shall constitute a grant of the right to strike to employees
of any municipal employer and such strikes are prohibited."80 Connect-
icut has not been free of strikes, and the sanction used has been the
injunction.
s7
Contrast Section 210 of the New York law, which imposes sanctions on
employees who engage in a strike: "probation for a term of one year;"
deduction from compensation of "an amount equal to twice his daily
rate of pay for each day or part thereof" that an employee is on strike.
It also penalizes the employee organization through the loss of mem-
85. ' .icH. Cozts. LAWs ANN. §§ 423.246 and 423.241 (Supp. 1969.
86. CONN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 7-475 (Supp. 1969).
87. See, e.g., Injunction against strike by employees of New Haven Department of
Public Works, reported in 283 GERR B-9 (Feb. 10, 1969).
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bership dues deduction for a period to be determined by the Public
Employment Relations Board."" Moreover, Section 211 mandates "the
chief legal officer of the government involved" to apply for an injunc-
tion.89 Section 210 has elaborate procedural safeguards, and builds
flexibility into the sanction aimed at the union.0 0 As it applies to
individual employees, however, Section 210 seems to be rather inflex-
ible, and therefore in some situations will be overly harsh.
Within the boundaries that describe the role of sanctions in the
no-strike model-more than hortatory but within the community's
sense of fairness-each state must experiment and find its own way.
Time will help the policy-maker reach evaluative judgments; but it is
doubtful that a clear picture of a proper structure will ever emerge.
Nor should there be any expectation that wise sanctions for strikes
will eliminate strikes. Neither sanctions nor impasse procedures, alone
or in combination, can do more than ease the situation. In some cities
and states this will be enough. Society can tolerate some flouting of
the no-strike norm without it generating disrespect for law; and the
political process can tolerate some without becoming too distorted.
In other localities the prohibition on strikes may not work, no matter
what. Where this is the case, the task for policy-makers will be to accept
the strike and reduce its effects. There are more ways to do this than
may be generally thought.
C. The Legal Strike Model
The essentiality of governmental services has been urged by some
as the touchstone with which to judge the permissibility of public
employee strikes.91 Unfortunately, however, commentators have not
often recognized that this criterion describes three distinct problems:
first, the fact that disruption of some services will create an immediate
danger to public health and safety; second, the inelasticity of demand
for most governmental services; and, finally, the vulnerability of the
typical large city political structure to the strike weapon. A statutory
scheme which permits strikes must take each of these aspects of the
essentiality problem into account.
88. N.Y. Crv. SEm. LAW § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
89. N.Y. Cirv. SER. LAW § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
90. See note 88 supra.
91. See generally, Wellington and Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79
YArE LJ. 441 (1970).
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1. The Emergency Dispute Problem
Let us assume for analytic purposes that the emergency dispute
problem is the only one the municipality need consider. Clearly, where
a strike creates an immediate danger to public health and safety, the
strike weapon should be outlawed and resort to the prescribed post-
impasse procedures mandatory. Where the length of the strike deter-
mines the magnitude of the danger, however, special procedures for
invoking post-impasse procedures are necessary. For the strike, by hypo-
thesis, is tolerable for a time. One approach would be to empower a
public official, the governor or mayor, to invoke the procedures when
he determines that a health or welfare danger exists. This factual
determination should be final and not subject to judicial review. While
such review exists under Title II of the Taft-Hartley Act,1-2 its exten-
sion to the public sector seems unwise. To require that a court review
a purely prudential decision entails that the court do little more than
rubberstamp what has been done. This is not a good way to use courts.
A difficulty with giving the executive authority to determine when
a strike must stop is that he is apt to be a party to the dispute. If it is
thought that the appearance of unfairness will significantly lessen the
law's acceptability, it may be preferable to entrust the power to deter-
mine whether an emergency exists to an independent, specialized
agency, such as the one empowered to administer the public employees
law. That agency would act upon the petition of the public employer.
Its procedures should ensure a speedy decision, which, again, should
be final. However, the employer should, after a period of time, be free
to renew a rejected petition on grounds of changed conditions.
In the private sector, the question of when a strike constitutes a
genuine emergency has, however, never been resolved with finality.
The reason is not that an emergency cannot be defined in a way that
will satisfy informed opinion,9 3 but rather that the public inevitably
finds such a definition too narrow. Indeed, many of the cases of ad hoc
intervention by Presidents, or of resort to the "cooling off" provisions
of Taft-Hartley, have not involved disputes which were, strictly speak-
ing, emergencies. The political pressures surrounding strikes which
are severely inconvenient but not dangerous are such that strict obe-
dience to the criterion of actual emergency would involve too great a
political risk for a President to incur.
94
92. 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964); United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
93. Hildebrand, An Economic Definition of an Emergency Dispute, in Fx.u=cy Ds-
PTrrES .s NATIONAL PoLacy, supra note 81, at 3.
94. W.Lu GTON, supra note 12, at 270-274 (1968).
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The feasibility of a non-emergency strike model in the public sec-
tor is, therefore, doubtful from the start, for it requires that the law
distinguish between true emergency and inconvenience. That is the
very distinction which has proved unacceptable in the private sector.
Most strikes in the public sector-all those worth stagingg5-inconve-
nience a substantial part of the community. If the total ban on strikes
by public employees is to be relaxed, political adherence to a distinc-
tion between true emergencies and real inconvenience will be needed.
Paradoxically, this may make the utilization of a strict definition of
an emergency politically more acceptable in the public sector than in
the private. Contrary to the myth, it is often in the interest of a striking
union in the private sector to involve the government in the search for
a settlement. Long strikes frequently work to the advantage of the
employer, and a union which can avoid the long strike by invoking
government pressures for a settlement may have strengthened its hand
at the bargaining table.98 One reason for the unacceptability of the
strict definition of an emergency in the private sector, therefore, may
be the interest of labor in seeing the distinction between emergency
and inconvenience blurred.
Public employee unions, however, may view the problem differently.
Their choice is not between accepting a rational distinction or gaining
helpful government intervention. Rather, they must choose between
accepting the distinction between strikes which create an emergency
and those which inconvenience, or a complete statutory ban on strikes.
For this reason, such a distinction may be more acceptable politically
in the public sector than it has proven to be in the private.
On the other hand, the fact of inconvenience remains and the dis.
tinction must be accepted by what may be a reluctant public. This
probably means that where discretion to determine whether an emer-
gency exists is delegated, it should go to the independent, adminis-
trative tribunal rather than to an elected public official who will be
politically unable to apply the distinction.
A structure that permits strikes to continue only until they create
emergency conditions may, however, chill collective bargaining, because
95. Taylor, Public Employment: Strike or Procedures, 20 IND. & LAn. R , RL'v. 617
(1967).
96. "Government intervention and its anticipation are very likely to increase the prob.
ability of the short strike, and to make the short strikes pay off, by frustrating normal
negotiation and removing the option of the long strike.' Livernash, The Relation ol
Power to the Structure and Process of Collective Bargaining, 6 J. LAw & EcoN. 10, 15
(1963).
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the parties will be able to predict the length of the strike and calculate
accordingly. The party which stands to gain by waiting out the strike
will do so. Much of this effect can be mitigated, however, by utilizing
a choice of procedures as a post-impasse structure, and by taking what-
ever steps are available in a particular dispute to create uncertainty
as to the length of time the strike will be permitted01
The definition of strike-created emergency conditions should not be
overly difficult to write, although local conditions will produce the
usual variations. There must be an immediate danger of serious injury
to public health and safety. Police and fire services, it would seem,
may not be disrupted for any amount of time without such a danger
being created. Here the damage occurs so quickly and in such unfore-
seen ways that no hiatus can be safely permitted. 8 Other kinds of strikes
are not so clear-cut. The disruption of utility services, for instance, may
not create an emergency for some time, depending on the degree of
disruption, the nature of the service, the time of year, the availability
of substitutes at a subsistence level, the extent of automation, and other
factors.
A strike in health services is, for example, most critical where the
operation of hospitals is concerned. But even with hospitals, variables,
such as the ability to maintain partial operations, the location of
non-struck hospitals, and the time of year, may keep the impact of
the strike below the emergency level.
Sanitation disputes similarly do not inevitably endanger public
health and safety. The problem is most aggravated in large urban areas,
but a suburb with an accessible dump may encounter little danger.
Even strikes in transportation may be tolerated for a period, sometimes
until settlement, depending on substitutes and the extent to which
the damage done is mainly economic. Strikes by welfare employees
probably do not constitute an emergency immediately. The disruption
of services surrounding public housing will create emergencies most
often in cold weather and in circumstances in which the tenants are
unable to make minimal provision for themselves. And in education,
most experience has shown that the risk is to political careers rather
than to the health and safety of the public. Lost school days can be
recaptured, often at times of the year which might make teachers think
twice before striking. Strikes by support personnel must be judged by
97. See notes 81-82, supra, and accompanying text.
98. The recent experience in Montreal suggests that a real danger to health and safety
can occur within hours of the start of a walk-out.
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the extent to which they disrupt related functions. Other governmental
services do not by any standard seem to threaten the health and safety
of the public, or even produce significant inconvenience.
Two things, then, are clear. First, the size of a municipality and the
degree to which it is prone to strike-created emergencies are related.
The extent of division of labor and the distance to alternative services
combine to make large cities highly vulnerable. The problem of public
employees is truly part of the "urban crisis." Second, strikes by most
public employees that fall short of emergencies are nevertheless severely
inconvenient to a significant segment of the community. If there are
to be strikes, that is the minimum price that must be paid.
To sum up: the emergency dispute problem does not compel a
complete ban on strikes. Many public employee strikes are not a danger
to health and safety, at least not immediately. 09 And while non-emer-
gency strikes cause inconvenience, that may not be reason enough to
ban strikes.
2. The Inelastic Demand Problem
The second sense in which essentiality may be used as the touchstone
upon which the strike question is resolved relates to the inelasticity of
demand for most governmental services. Because there are few close
substitutes for such services and virtually no fear of entry by a non-
union rival, the demand for many governmental services is relatively
insensitive to price. And because the demand for labor is derived from
the demand for the product, this means that public employee unions
face a relatively insignificant trade-off between benefits received and
unemployment incurred in pursuing their demands.
It must be conceded that government can do little about the lack
of close substitutes for its services. Indeed, it is often the very lack of
substitutes which led government to undertake these functions in the
first place. But the inelasticity of demand for governmental services
does not necessarily mean excessive wages for governmental employees,
any more than the inelasticity of demand for some agricultural prod-
ucts means excessive income for farmers. It is the lack of competition-
monopoly-which permits producers to take advantage of an inelastic
demand schedule. And where unions are concerned, it is principally
the strike and the strike threat which enable them to exploit such an
advantageous market position. If we employ measures which reduce
99. See Burton and Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees,
79 YAt. UJ. 418, 432 et seq. (1970).
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the effectiveness of the strike weapon, therefore, at least part of the
difficulty created by the inelasticity of demand for governmental
services will be solved. We turn then, to that problem.
3. The Problem of the City's Vulnerability
The final sense in which essentiality is used goes to the effectiveness
of the public employee strike. Such strikes generally inconvenience
people and these people are also voters. Other things being equal, they
will vote in a way which eliminates the inconvenience; that is, which
avoids or brings about an end to the strike. And all too often, other
things will be equal. 00 Because the cost of a settlement may frequently
be passed on to larger political units or hidden in the bowels of an
incomprehensible municipal budget, voters will tend to choose politi-
cal leaders who avoid inconveniencing strikes over those who work to
minimize the costs of settlements at the price of a strike. Costs which
are not imposed on voters are hardly likely to deter them from pres-
suring for a settlement no matter what its size. And costs effectively
hidden by the genius of municipal accountants as well as understated
by the parties will not induce voters to urge firmness by their elected
officials in the face of an inconveniencing strike. The net effect is that
the typical municipal political structure is altogether too vulnerable
to strikes by public employees, and that other groups in the political
process are thereby disadvantaged. This is true whether the strike is
over monetary or non-monetary issues, although in the latter case
organized groups whose interests are threatened by union demands
may create countervailing pressures of varying impact.
The suggestions we are about to make aim to reduce the vulner-
ability of the public employer. They are neither mutually exclusive
nor always complementary. Depending upon local variables, they may
be employed individually or together.
a. Contingency Planning
The first thing government should consider are various ways in
which the effect of strikes by public employees can be mitigated. To
100. This is not to suggest that large numbers of politicians win have their careers
terminated as a result of large numbers of strikes, for they are far too shrewd not to
appreciate the risk. These facts of life are already more apparent to the politicians than
to industrial relations commentators, which is perhaps to be expected. Mayor Lindsay"s
early and generous settlement with the teachers showed his lack of confidence in the re-
peated assertions by labor "experts" that strikes in the public sector do not differ from
those in the private. That insight, and his great luck in having his most formidable
opponents eliminated in the Democratic primary, may have been the most important fac-
tors in his election victory.
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this end, a municipality with a potential for public employee labor
trouble should engage in careful contingency planning. There are, of
course, limits to what can be accomplished through planning, particu-
larly where the unions involved regard any attempt to find substitutes
for struck services as a form of strikebreaking and use all of their con-
siderable powers to stop it.101 Nevertheless, some things can be done.
Prepared emergency traffic patterns and parking facilities can offset
some of the consequences of a transit strike. Contingency plans as to
the use of neighboring hospitals may avoid disasters in a hospital strike.
Automating the most critical functions before a dispute occurs can
reduce the impact of a strike enormously. Many utility strikes today
are hardly noticed by the public because automation permits contin-
ued service. And prepared written directions to businesses and indi-
viduals indicating how they may help themselves and others can limit
the impact of many kinds of strikes. Again, the helpfulness of such
measures can be easily overstated, but there may be a great temptation
to procrastinate, either because of lethargy or a desire not to appear
provocative.
b. Partial Operations
Another approach deserves serious consideration. It seems evident
that emergencies, and the most severe inconveniences caused by strikes,
can be avoided by partial operation of the struck facility. Partial opera-
tion, moreover, can be tailored so as to leave substantial pressure on
government to settle. Policemen can keep order without giving out
parking tickets, directing traffic, arresting for minor offenses, doing
paper work, or testifying for the prosecution in criminal cases. Fire-
men can prevent conflagrations without doing the normal housekeeping
details. Welfare checks can be processed, and all other welfare services
cease. Garbage can be collected, but less often. Subway service can be
reduced by half.
The goal of any partial operation scheme is, first, to ensure per-
formance of those functions essential to health and safety and the
avoidance of severe inconveniences; and, second, to maintain sufficient
pressure on government to settle. From the union's point of view, the
advantage is a legal, albeit partial, strike and some continuing income
for its members.
101. The reaction of the New York City sanitation workers to Mayor Lindsay's threat
of using the National Guard to pick up garbage was both volatile and effective. It stirrcd
the emotions of those who view "strikebreaking" with contempt and caused Governor
Rockefeller to refuse to abide by the Mayor's wishes.
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Partial operation schemes will, of course, work best as law if agreed
upon by the parties. In the private sector, agreement on such schemes
has been so infrequent or non-existent as to discourage, until recently,
much inquiry along this route. But private sector unions have the right
to strike and often are helped by government intervention.1 02 In the
public sector, the right to strike has been withheld and may be an ac-
ceptable quid for the quo of continuing specified operations. Such
operations, moreover, may be spread among the affected workers so
they all receive some compensation during the strike period.
Consideration of partial operations in the private sector has peren-
nially raised the issue as to which of several plants or companies should
continue to operate under the arrangement.103 The inability to find a
way to spread the benefits of partial operation has been one of the reefs
on which such schemes have been wrecked. In the public sector, the
lack of competing employers, and the relative ease with which almost
all the employees can share,104 may facilitate the working out of such
arrangements, which can then be enacted into legislation.
c. Changing the Political Process
We have argued, in effect, that government should take steps which
lessen the impact of strikes by public employees. In addition, it should
consider certain measures which tend to decrease public willingness to
call for settlements without much regard for the costs involved. Such
measures, if institutionalized, might be accompanied by a relaxation
on the ban against strikes in non-emergency situations.
One source of vulnerability is that the cost of settlement is hard to
find in a municipal budget. Any measure which sharpens the public's
awareness of the cost of a settlement, therefore, will tend to decrease
the political pressure for a precipitous settlement.
A tactic, more useful in small and middle-sized communities than in
giant urban centers, is to publish the salaries of the individual public
employees involved by name. Where these salaries seem higher than
those received for comparable work in the private sector, public sym-
pathy for the strikers will not be very great, and political leaders may
be less fearful of a backlash at the polls because they resist union de-
102. See note supra and accompanying text.
103. Partial operations in the private sector usually permits one or more firms and
one group of workers to profit while the rest suffer the effects of a strike. Thus, it is the
internal divisions within the employer group and unions which prevent agreement.
104. If the subways operate at 50% capacity, for instance, it ought to be possible to
find ways to see that all employees work around 50% of their normal time.
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mands at the price of a strike. In Waterbury, Connecticut, a taxpayers'
revolt over teachers' salaries was caused by just such a tactic.105
Another device might be to specify in tax bills the allocation of taxes
among various functions of government or the amount attributable to
collective agreements. Taypayer groups, and the like, may thus be
aided in leading opposition against union demands.
Another source of vulnerability is the municipalities' ability to pass
costs on to larger political units. Voters who do not pay the costs of a
settlement will not encourage their elected officials to resist union de-
mands. There is one measure which serves both to put the costs of
the settlement on those who have the greatest incentive to call for
settlement, and to increase the visibility of those costs. One not uncom-
mon and suggestive feature of the municipal scene is the fiscally inde-
pendent school district.1 6 Such districts have independent power to
finance their budgets by raising taxes directly without the approval
of a reviewing body. It may be possible to fashion analogues of such
districts for bargaining units of public employees by creating coexten-
sive independent tax districts. Such districts might finance the perform-
ance of the whole function involved, as the fiscally independent school
districts do, or merely raise the amount necessary to finance the mone-
tary costs of a collective agreement.
The advantage of tax districts coextensive with bargaining units are
evident. Those who clamor for a settlement will see in the plainest
possible way the cost. In addition, the ability of a municipality to pass
these costs on will be limited since the money will be raised automatic-
ally from a tax district within its boundaries. A similar device is the
imposition of user costs on those who benefit from municipal services.
The subsidization by the state or federal government of municipal
functions from which funds have been diverted for collective bargain-
ing purposes may seem to be no more than an indirect means of paying
the costs of collective bargaining. It seems doubtful, however, that state
or federal governments will regulate their subsidies so carefully that
municipalities with strong public employee unions will get propor-
tionately more money for other functions than municipalities without
such unions. If that is the case, the ability of some municipalities to
pass on the costs of settlements will be lessened.
Other structural changes in the organization of municipal govern-
105. Lewis and Lynch, Budgets and Public Bargaining 25 (unpublished 1969), on file
in Yale Law Library.
106. See IiEBmAN & iMosKow, CoLLacvE NEGOTIATIONS rOR TEActErS 277 et seq.
(1966).
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ments may permit non-emergency strikes, but penalize their use in
some way. Settlements reached after a strike might be subject to ap-
proval by a referendum among registered voters. The referendum
might ask the voters to approve the estimated tax consequences of the
settlement. If conducted within the framework of tax districts coexten-
sive with bargaining units, the referendum would not only ratify the
settlement but also levy the necessary taxes.1
07
Where analogous structures actually exist, considerable pressure on
the size of financial settlements has occurred. In Portland, Oregon, the
local education tax cannot increase more than 6% per year without
a local vote or a special levy. As a result, the settlements reached appear
to be considerably less than would have been the case had the school
board and union been free to bargain without having to persuade the
voters.'-0 And in San Francisco, the only substantial check on the abil-
ity of public employee unions to achieve their demands through political
pressure has been the willingness of the city's Chamber of Commerce
to threaten to utilize local procedures which permit wage rates to be
submitted to a referendum. Indeed, the principal negotiations in San
Francisco are often between the unions and the Chamber.
The referendum device increases the visibility of a settlement's cost
and places it on those voters with the most power to resist. Futhermore,
union leaders are encouraged to make their deal with elected officials
rather than risk the unknowns of a referendum. Such settlements are
apt to be smaller than those which would follow strikes under present
structures. The officials, moreover, have an incentive to settle and
thereby claim credit for avoiding a strike, but are able, if no settlement
is reached, to escape the dilemma of choosing between the wrath of
those inconvenienced by a strike and those enraged by increased taxes.
The officials in such structures are, once an impasse is reached and a
strike called, able to assume more of a neutral stance since they lack
the power to make a final settlement. Thus, in Portland and San Fran-
cisco, local officials sometimes have been more concerned with helping
the unions estimate what the voters will accept than with acting as true
adversaries. This has been so even though the referendum device in
neither case requires that a strike precede it.
107. This device may in some circumstances be a case of overkill. Sec generallv, Rehmus,
supra note 13. The example of Youngstown, Ohio, where taxpayers refused to authorize
suffident funds to keep the schools open for a full school year suggests that considerable
resistance to tax increases can be expected where specific items are put to a referendum.
273 GERR B-4 (Dec. 2, 1968). On the other hand, such a mechanism may be vwholly in-
adequate when a union represents a small number of employees because their total wage
bill may never be enough to affect the voter adversely.
108. Lewis & Lynch, supra note 105, at 34 et seq.
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All of these suggestions indicate the direction in which collective
bargaining structures in public employment must go if non-emergency
strikes are to be permitted. Arrangements which lessen the impact of
such strikes should be created and the costs of settlement made more
visible. Those who can decide to settle a dispute must know the costs
of that settlement and must bear them. Where possible, incentives to
settle without a strike should be created and public officials relieved of
the dilemma strikes now put them in. These suggestions are just that,
and they are not exhaustive. Local conditions will determine the ap-
propriateness of any particular device and of permitting non-emer-
gency strikes at all. And such conditions will undoubtedly suggest other
devices. Experimentation is necessary, for it is clear that the strike ban,
wise as it is in theory, will not work in all places at all times.100
Whatever arrangements a community makes for dealing with strikes
by public employees, a second major labor question, namely, what
should be the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector, still
awaits community attention.
V. The Scope of Bargaining
As we have stated, one problem raised by public employee unionism
is how to resolve issues which arise at the bargaining table but are also
controversial political matters. This problem is difficult because it
threatens to distort the political process and sometimes crops up in
ways which place considerable stress on society-witness the New York
decentralization dispute.
A. The Public Schools and Other Illustrations
Scope of bargaining problems in public employment are best illus-
trated by our schools. In primary and secondary education there are
at least three subjects with important educational policy implications
that have found, and increasingly are finding, their way into the bar-
gaining process. They are class size, student discipline, and curricular
reform.
Of the three, class size is the most "ancient," the subject most regu-
larly negotiated, and the one most clearly related to teachers' working
conditions. Bernard Donovan, the former Superintendent of Schools
109. The Bureau of Labor Statistics' study, Work Stoppages in Government, 1958-68
(1970) shows substantial differences among the Midwest, Northeast, South and West In
the number of strikes by government employees during the decade. The study is repro.
duced in 350 GERR D-1. See particularly D-8, D-9 and D-15.
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in New York City, described his ambivalence about the legitimacy of
union bargaining over class size when he asked:
What is class size? Is it a working condition or is it a matter of
educational policy? If you think it over, you will find it is a gray
area. There are elements in it that have to do with a teacher's
working conditions, in terms of load. But there are also elements
in it that have to do with the proper number of children that
can be handled for a specific type of subject under particular cir-
cumstances. 110
In New York City, collective agreements have addressed questions of
class size since 1963. In Chicago the present agreement relates class
size to the subject matter taught; in Detroit, to student scores on read-
ing tests.' The New Haven contract provides:
No class from Grades 1-12 shall have more than 35 [pupils].
In the school year 1969-1970 no class shall have more than 34
pupils.
The tendency for class size to become a subject of collective bargain-
ing may not be of great concern. While the subject is important to edu-
cational policy, it bears directly upon working conditions, and few
would argue that smaller classes are undesirable. Moreover, existing
physical facilities tend to limit the range of demands a union can re-
alistically make, at least in the short run."-' Yet, if class size should
have rather low priority as a matter of educational policy, and if there
are many more important factors in education, all of which compete
with class size for too few dollars, then one can hardly fail to be anxious
about the distortion built into educational policy decisions that may
result from determining class size through collective bargaining.
Little community agreement exists with respect to the role and na-
ture of student discipline in public education; yet student behavior is
an increasingly major concern in many public schools, particularly
those located in racially tense urban centers. The deterrent effect of
punishment for misbehavior, the educational and rehabilitative goals
of disciplinary proceedings, and the safety of teachers and other stu-
110. Donovan, Speaking for Management, in R&,DiNcs ON Cou. crnIz NEcoruTio.s
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 287, 288 (S. Elam, M. Lieberman and M. Moskow eds. 1967).
ll. The Chicago agreement is reproduced in § 6(b), 287 GERR 32 (Mar. 10, I9q9J(contracts); and 336 GERR 7 (Feb. 16, 1970) (contracts). For the Detroit provision, e S0
GERR B-4 (June 30, 1969).
112. However, in Chicago, the CTO president has said that: "Where no space exists
for the increased number of classes [resulting from the reduction in class size], portable
classrooms will be employed ..... " 333 GERR B.8 (Jan. 26, 1970).
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dents are matters of vast importance and an item of high visibility on
many communities' agenda. The teachers' interest in the matter is un-
deniable; but so is the students', the parents' and the rest of the com-
munity's.
Traditionally, discipline has been the prerogative of management;
the superintendent and the school board (generally elected by the
community) have set policy.113 Increasingly, however, student disci-
plinary problems are becoming, in one form or another, a subject for
collective bargaining. Some contract provisions, such as the one in
the New Haven agreement, raise no questions of disproportionate con-
trol over the decision-making process in this area. The provision
merely ensures that a teacher injured by a student will receive full
salary while recovering. This clause does not, therefore, address ques-
tions of educational policy."
4
This is not the conclusion, however, to be drawn from a provision
found in other collective agreements. The language in the Huntington,
Long Island contract obviously represents a decision about educational
policy. It reads,
Any child designated by a school psychologist as ... emotionally
disturbed shall be admitted to or retained in a regular class only
with the consent of the teacher." 5
In such cities as Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Wilmington,
Delaware, "the adjustment of behavioral problems" as a "joint respon-
sibility [bargainable issue]" seems well established. In the Wilmington
agreement, principals are required to suspend students under circum-
stances spelled out in the contract and to refer certain types of cases
to the police. The agreement also entitles a teacher to call a parental
conference or to refer a student to a psychologist without the approval
of his principal."16
Some negotiated disciplinary provisions may move a school system
toward proper educational goals. But the position taken by a union is
unlikely to reflect more than what its members believe is good educa-
tional policy consistent with their own self-interest. Other groups may
have different views and ought to have an opportunity to "make [them-
113. "About 15 per cent of the boards of education, mostly in large cities, are appointed
by the mayor or municipal governing body." Moskow and Doherty, United States, in
TEACHER UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 295, 296 (A. Blum, ed. 1969).
114. Art. XII, 287 GERR 29, 40 (Mar. 10, 1969) (contracts).
115. Art. VIII (g), 270 GERR 123, 128 (Nov. 11, 1968) (contracts).
116. Art. V (G), 316 GERR 159, 164 (Sept. 29, 1969) (contracts).
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selves] heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of dei-
sion."117 Unhappily, collective bargaining may make that impossible.
When bargaining is over curricular changes, the educational stakes
may be even higher. This, coupled perhaps with the fact that curricu-
lar matters are less obviously related to conditions of teachers' employ-
ment, may explain the relatively slower development of collective
bargaining about curricular matters. Yet, as Donald Wollett has testi-
fied, "[t]eacher involvement in the development of curriculum and
other educational programs is increasingly common."" 8 This involve-
ment often touches educational policy at its most sensitive point: pro-
grams for underprivileged children.
The More Effective Schools program (IMES) of New York City, for
example, seeks to improve the education of ghetto elementary students
through drastic cuts in class size and a series of specialized services.
While MES was not developed in collective bargaining, the United
Federation of Teachers had a role in the program's design." 0 In 1967,
when the UFT anticipated that MES would be reduced in scope, it
sought a specific contractual commitment to the program from the
Board of Education. The bargaining process produced a promise of
ten million dollars to programs in this general field and a tripartite
union-administration-community board of governance, with veto power
in the Superintendent. 0
The 1969 UFT Agreement clearly establishes collective bargaining
as a method through which educational innovation is to develop in
New York City. In addition to the MES program, the contract re-
quires, for example, the Board of Education to create yet unplanned
pre-school centers in fifty elementary schools.'
What happens in New York City often sets the pace in other cities.
Joint control over curricular matters is taking hold in such places as
Chicago and Washington, D.C.222 In Detroit and Philadelphia there
are beginnings, and in some smaller communities the same trend is
discernible.m
117. R. Dah, supra note 2, at 145 (1956).
118. Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 Mlcir. L.
REv. 1017, 1027 (1969).
119. See Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public Edu.
cation: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MIcu. L. Rnv. 1033, 1G7-48
(1969).
120. Id. at 1060-64.
121. 303 GERR B-7 (June 30, 1969).
122. See Bd. of Educ. & Chicago Teachers Union, 336 GERR 7 (Feb. 16. 1970) (con.
tracts). See generally, T. Brunner, Including Educational Policy Issues in the Scope of
Teacher Bargaining: Some Legal and Political Considerations 1969 (unpublished manu-
script on file in Yale Law Library).
123. Wollett, supra note 118.
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These scope of bargaining problems in public education have their
counterparts in other areas of public employment. Consider the police
and the issue of a civilian police review board. For the officer and his
union a review board which can determine whether his official conduct
was improper is a condition of employment analogous to the hand-
ling of discipline and discharge in the private sector. Yet the interest
of the community in the civilian review board issue is immense.
So, too, are the questions of how many shifts or platoons should
be established, whether police are to be required to receive sensitivity
training, what such training should consist of, and the use of para-
police personnel for special assignments.
12 4
Similar problems with similar complexities exist in collective bar-
gaining by firefighters, nurses and social workers. These are nascent
problems with a potential for confrontation between public employees
and other interest groups in the community. Today in most munici.
palities this potential is obscured, either because there is no real
collective bargaining or because collective bargaining is very new.
Where there is no bargaining in a strict sense, there may be various
forms of consultation by city management with employee groups. The
consultation may be private; it may be at public hearings. The em-
ployees and their unions constitute an interest group with access to
municipal decision-makers similar to that enjoyed by other interest
groups in a community. Sometimes the influence of the unions is great,
sometimes not. The important point, however, is that there is, in the
absence of bargaining, no formal, legal, institutionalized arrangement
for influencing decisions available to the employee and his union that
is different from those available to other groups in the community.
Where the union is undifferentiated from other interest groups, con.
sultation between union and management may be very broad or very
narrow in scope. In such circumstances, the influence a union may
bring to bear will be determined by the political power it can wield
as an interest group active in the political process. This may be a cause
of community concern on occasion, but the concern is of a different
sort from that which we have been addressing. It is the result primarily
of apathy by other groups, and skill by the union, rather than of laws
that create institutional arrangements designed to increase the power
of a particular group.
124. See generally, J. Futch, P. Gewirtz, & T. Humphrey, Collective Bargaining In the
Public Sector: "Fuzz, Flamers, and Garbage," 1969 (unpublished manuscript on file In
Yale Law Library).
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Where genuine collective bargaining is new, as it is in many of our
cities, the unions are still primarily occupied with recognition, finan-
cial terms, and union security. With time they can be expected to press
for expansion of the scope of bargaining, and then the problems will
come dearly into focus. One way to measure the breadth of these prob-
lems is again to examine the differences between the public and pri-
vate sectors.
B. The Private and Public Sectors Compared
From the beginning of American labor history the scope of bargain-
ing has been a vexing question. Even today no labor problem in the
private sector is more overgrown with ideological rhetoric."" This
controversy is durable because union pressure has been to expand the
scope of bargaining. While negotiations once were limited to "tradi-
tional" subject matter-wages, hours, etc.-they now extend to such
matters as plant location, pensions, contracting-out of work, and the
pace of technological change. Indeed, it is changing technology and
changing economic relationships and structures that lead to changing
bargaining demands and changing areas of dispute.'-"
Under the Labor-Management Relations Act, the employer does
not have to agree. He need only bargain in good faith over "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."'12 It is this
phrase, "other terms and conditions of employment," through which
the law exerts leverage on the scope of bargaining.
However, because the employer need not agree, and because the
market restrains him, an expanding legal definition of terms and con-
ditions of employment means, that if a union negotiates an agreement
over more subjects, it generally trades off more of less for less of more.
From the employer's point of view, most encroachments on what has
been its unilateral power to manage are measured on a single scale:
their effect on cost. Of course there is internal political conflict within
an enterprise when a union seeks to extend its control. But the pres-
sure on the employer, as an enterprise, is to resist any increase in cost
and, ultimately, it is hurt no more or less because that cost is extracted
through inefficient work rules or high wages. Management resistance
to union demands, therefore, will tend to force the union to make
trade-offs based on those costs.
125. See generally, N. CHAmmaRrAI., THE LABOR SEcror 340-53 (1965).
126. See W. WJIRZ, LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREsT 48 (1964).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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From the consumer's point of view this in turn means that the price
of the product he purchases is not significantly related to the scope of
bargaining. And since unions rarely bargain about the nature of the
product produced, 128 the consumer can be relatively indifferent as to
how many or how few subjects are covered in any collective agree-
ment.1
29
In the public sector the cluster of problems that surround the scope
of bargaining are much more troublesome than they are in the private
sector. The problems have several dimensions.
First, there would seem to be less of a trade-off between subjects of
bargaining in the public sector than in the private. Where political
leaders view the costs of union demands as essentially budgetary, a
trade-off can occur. Thus, a demand for higher teacher salaries and a
demand for reduced class size may be treated as part of one package.
But, where a demand is viewed as involving essentially political costs,
trade-offs are more difficult. A mayor, for example, may be under great
pressure to make a large monetary settlement with a teachers' union
whether or not it is joined with demands designed to deter a decentral-
ization scheme. Interest groups will exert pressure against union de-
mands only when they are directly affected. Otherwise, they will join
that large constituency which wants to avoid labor trouble. Trade-offs
can occur only when several demands are resisted by roughly the same
groups. Thus, budgetary demands can be traded off when they are
opposed by taxpayers. But when the identity of the resisting group
changes with each demand, political leaders may find it expedient to
strike a balance on each issue individually, rather than as part of a
total package, by measuring the political power of each interest group
involved against the political power of the constituency pressing for
labor peace. Expansion of the subjects of bargaining in the public
128. The fact that American unions and management are generally economically
oriented is a source of great freedom to us all. If either the unions or management decided
to make decisions about the nature of services provided or products manufactured on the
basis of their own ideological convictions, we would all, as consumers, be less free.
Although unions may misallocate resources, consumers are still generally free to satisfy
strong desires for particular products by paying more for them and sacrificing less valued
items. This is because unions and management generally make no attempt to adjust to
anything but economic considerations. Were it otherwise, and the unions-or manage-
ment-insisted that no products of a certain kind be manufactured, consumers would have
much less choice.
129. The major qualification to these generalizations is that sometimes unions can
generate more support from the membership for certain demands than for others (more
for the size of the work crew, less for wage increases). Just how extensive this phenomenon
is, and how it balances out over time, is difficult to say; however, it would not seem to
be of too great importance in the overall picture.
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sector, therefore, may increase the total quantum of union power in
the political process.
Second, public employees do not generally produce a product. They
perform a service. The way in which a service is performed may be-
come a subject of bargaining. As a result, the nature of that service
may be changed. As we have seen, some of these services involve ques-
tions that are politically, socially or ideologically sensitive. In part
this is because government is involved and alternatives to govern-
mentally provided services are relatively dear. In part, government is
involved because of society's perception about the nature of the ser-
vice and society's need for it. This suggests that decisions affecting the
nature of a governmentally provided service are much more likely to
be challenged and are more urgent than generally is the case with
services that are offered privately.
Third, some of the services government provides are performed by
professionals-teachers, social workers, etc.-who are keenly interested
in the underlying philosophy that informs their work. To them, theirs
is not merely a job to be done for a salary. They may be educators or
other "change agents" of society. And this may mean that these em-
ployees are concerned with more than incrementally altering a govern-
mental service or its method of delivery. They may be advocates of
bold departures which will radically transform the service itself.
The issue is not a threshold one of whether professional public em-
ployees should participate in decisions about the nature of the services
they provide. We take it as given that any properly run governmental
agency should be interested in, and heavily reliant upon, the judgment
of its professional staff. The issue rather is the method of that partici-
pation. Conclusions about this issue may be facilitated by addressing
some aspects of the governmental decision-making process-particu-
larly at the municipal level-and the impact of collective bargaining
on that process.
Few students of our cities would object to Herbert Kaufman's obser-
vation that:
Decisions of the municipal government emanate from no single
source, but from many centers; conflicts and clashes are referred to
no single authority, but are settled at many levels and at many
points in the system: no single group can guarantee the success
of any proposal it supports, the defeat of every idea it objects to.
Not even the central governmental organs of the city-the Mayor,
the Board of Estimate, the Council-individually or in combi-
nation, even approach mastery in this sense.
Each separate decision center consists of a cluster of interested
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contestants, with a "core group" in the middle, invested by the
rules with the formal authority to legitimize decisions (that is to
promulgate them in binding form) and a constellation of related
"satellite groups" seeking to influence the authoritative issuances
of the core group.130
Nor would many disagree with Nelson W. Polsby when, in discussing
community decision-making that is concerned with an alternative to a
"current state of affairs," he argues that tJe alternative "must be
politically palatable and relatively easy to accomplish; otherwise great
amounts of influence have to be brought to bear with great skill and
efficiency in order to secure [its] adoption."
131
We suggest that such matters as school decentralization and a ci.
vilian police review board are, where they do not exist, alternatives to
the "current state of affairs," which are not "politically palatable and
relatively easy to accomplish." If a teachers' union or a police union
were to bargain with the municipal employer over these questions,
and were able to use the strike to insist that the proposals not be
adopted, we wonder how much "skill and efficiency" on the part of
the proposals' advocates would be necessary to effect a change. And,
to put the shoe on the other foot, if a teachers' union were to insist
through collective bargaining (with the strike or its threat) upon major
changes in school curriculum, would not that union have to be con-
siderably less skillful and efficient in the normal political process than
other advocates of community change? The point is that with respect
to some subjects, collective bargaining may be too powerful a lever on
municipal decision-making, too effective a technique for changing or
preventing the change of one small but important part of the "current
state of affairs."
Nor is the problem merely the strike threat and the strike. In a sys.
tem where sophisticated impasse procedures involving third parties
substantially reduce work stoppages, third party intervention must be
partly responsive to union demands. If the scope of bargaining is open-
ended, the neutral, to be effective, will have to work out accommoda-
tions which inevitably advance some of the union's claims some of the
time. And the neutral, with his eyes fixed on achieving a settlement,
can hardly be concerned with balancing all the items on the community
agenda or reflecting the interests of all relevant groups.
If this is so, how should the scope of bargaining in the public sector
be regulated so as adequately to limit the role of unions in the politi.
130. Metropolitan Leadership, quoted in N. Polsby, infra note 131, at 127-28,
131. N. POISBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND PoLiTicAL TEORY 135 (1963).
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cal decision-making process? An answer to this question depends, in
part, upon the current state of the law.
C. Regulation of the Scope of Bargaining
1. Civil Service
In most jurisdictions the law pertaining to the scope of bargaining
in public employment not only fails adequately to deal with the prob-
lems we have addressed, but often interferes with appropriate collective
bargaining by perpetuating an anachronistic civil service system. Civil
service or merit systems were established to rationalize the relation-
ship of government and its employees. Mindful of a spoils system
with its corrupting influence on the public service and of the need for
impartiality and objectivity in the recruitment, promotion and dis-
charge of government employees, advocates of civil service have been
extremely successful in obtaining legislation at the state, county and
municipal levels. Not infrequently, however, the civil service has be-
come encrusted with bureaucratic barnacles, and frequently its admin-
istration complicates the achievement of a rational regime of collective
bargaining.
Conflict between civil service systems and unionization transcend
scope of bargaining issues. Indeed, the major task of accommodat-
ing the two relates to a pervasive and peculiarly governmental labor
problem: determining who the public employer is. It is not uncommon
for civil service commissions to insist that they, alone or in combina-
tion with other agencies, are the public employer for purposes of
employee relations. David T. Stanley makes clear the source of diffi-
culty:
What do we mean by merit systems? We should distinguish
them from the merit principle under which public employees are
recruited, selected, and advanced under conditions of political
neutrality, equal opportunity, and competition on the basis of
merit and competence. Public employee unions do not question
this principle in general and have done little to weaken it, as
yet. When we say merit systems, however, this has come to mean a
broad program of personnel management activities. Some are es-
sential to carrying out the merit principle: recruiting, selecting,
policing of anti-political and anti-discrimination rules, and admin-
istering related appeals provisions. Others are closely related
and desirable: position classification, pay administration, employee
benefits, and training. Unions are of course interested in both
categories 3
2
132. Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems? 31 Pumac PEnsoN.E REv.
108, 109 (1970).
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Two general types of situations should be distinguished. The first is
where there is no legislation mandating collective bargaining and such
bargaining is desired by employees. As we remarked earlier, unions
nevertheless may have penetrated the decision-making process to vary-
ing degrees of depth and scope. By and large, neither the depth nor
the total impact on decisions, however, is as great as where there is
legislation.133 In the absence of legislation, the union may have to at-
tempt to influence many different "employers," including a civil
service commission, on matters of hiring and firing, promotions, re-
classifications, wages, and grievance procedures. Unless the locus of
employer authority is in the civil service commission, or the civil
service commission is controlled by the mayor or his designee, the
unions' task can be frustrating indeed. Nor is it uncommon to find, for
example, competing grievance procedures, one established between
agency and union, the other administered by the civil service commis-
sion.1 34
Where there is legislation for public unions, the problem will per-
sist if the statute is unclear in its definition of the public employer-
unless informal accommodations are created.135 But even if the public
employer is defined, the civil service commission may retain most of
its statutory powers and undermine collective bargaining over subjects
normally considered appropriate for union-management negotiations.
Few states have addressed the role of civil service commissions in
the collective bargaining process. Of those that have, the majority ap-
pear to resolve conflicts in favor of the commissions. Typical is the
Massachusetts statute which states: "Nothing in section ... 178M [the
Right to Bargain statute] . . . shall diminish the authority and power
of the civil service commission . .. ."136
Likewise, the California statute provides:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the pro-
visions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances and rules
of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit or
civil service system or which provide for other methods of admin-
istering employer-employee relations. This chapter is intended,
instead, to strengthen merit, civil service and other methods of ad-
133. See generally, Gerhart, The Scope of Bargaining in Local Government Negotia.
tions, in PROCFEDINGS OF THE 1969 ANNUAL SPRINC MFETING, IRRA 545.
134. This had been the situation, for example, in Dayton, Ohio. See generally, T.
Wender, Fragmentation of Authority for Collective Bargaining at the Local Level, 1969
(unpublished manuscript on file at Yale Law Library).
135. See, e.g., Civil Service Commission for the County of Wayne v. Wayne County
Board of Supervisors, 73 L.R.R.M. 2822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
136. MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1969).
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ministering employer-employee relations through the establish-
ment of uniform and orderly methods of communication between
employees and the public agencies by which they are employed.
(Emphasis added.) 37
The Oregon and Washington statutes also appear to subordinate the
collective bargaining provisions to civil service rules and regulations.'m
However, there is some uncertainty among local officials, especially in
Washington, as to which statute takes precedence.
The Wisconsin law, on the other hand, spells out those items over
which a public employer need not bargain:
Nothing herein shall require the employer to bargain in relation
to statutory and rule provided prerogatives of promotion, layoff,
position classification, compensation and fringe benefits, examina-
tions, discipline, merit salary determination policy and other ac-
tions provided for by law and rules governing civil service.'I
The Connecticut Municipal Employee Bargaining Law goes the
furthest of any state enactment in limiting the role of civil service com-
missions. Section 8(g) provides:
Nothing herein shall diminish the authority and power of any
municipal civil service commission, personnel board, personnel
agency or its agents established by statute, charter or special act
to conduct and grade merit examinations and to rate candidates in
the order of their relative excellence from which appointments or
promotions may be made to positions in the competitive division
of the classified service of the municipal employer served by such
civil service commission or personnel board. The conduct and the
grading of merit examinations, the rating of candidates and the
establishment of lists from such examinations and the appoint-
ments from such lists and any provision of any municipal charter
concerning political activity of municipal employees shall not be
subject to collective bargaining 4 0
However, the previous section states:
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a
municipal employer and an employee organization and approved
in accordance with the provisions of this act on matters appropri-
ate to collective bargaining, as defined in this act, and any charter,
special act, ordinance, rules or regulations adopted by the munici-
137. CAL Gov'T CODE § 3500 (Supp. 1969).
138. OR, REv. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780 (1967); WASH. Rnv. CoD ANN. §§ 41.56.010-.900
(Supp. 1969).
139. Wis. STAT. § 111.91(2) (1969).
140. CoNN. GE . STAT. ANN. § 7-474(g) (Supp. 1969).
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pal employer or its agents, such as a personnel board or civil
service commission . . . the terms of such agreement shall pre-
vail.141
Thus, the Connecticut statute excludes from collective bargaining
only the employment and promotion functions of civil service.
Apart from the employment of new applicants, the "merit principle"
probably should be pursued through collective bargaining and not
through a civil service system. For our present purposes, however, it
is important to observe that many governments through their civil
service laws have placed considerable restraints on the scope of bargain-
ing.
2. Other Restrictions on the Scope of Bargaining
Legal restraints on the scope of collective bargaining exist in statutes
other than those establishing civil service systems. The vast network
of state laws may, here and there, affect various aspects of public em-
ployment and, because they are rarely specifically directed at public
employees, impose bizarre patterns of regulation.1 42 The principal
source of law, however, is the public employee labor statutes them-
selves.
One type of public employee legislation is not directly on point: the
consult, or meet and confer, statute. The obligation such statutes im-
pose on public employers is to consult with the employee representa-
tives rather than to bargain with them. Even some of these do establish
guidelines for the scope of required consultation. Contrast, for exam-
ple, the California teachers' statute with the Oregon enactment. Ore-
gon confines talks to "matters of salaries and related economic policies
affecting profession services."' 43 In California, consultation is envi-
sioned over "all matters relating to employment conditions and em-
ployer-employee relations and ... with regard to all matters relating
to the definition of educational objectives, the determination of the
content of courses and curricula, the selection of textbooks, and other
aspects of the institutional program to the extent such matters are
within the direction of the public school employer."'
44
If, in fact, consultation rather than bargaining were a viable labor
policy for a state or municipality, there would seem to be little reason
141. Id. at § 7-474(f).
142. See Wender, supra note 134.
143. ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.460(1) (1969).
144. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West 1969).
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to impose any limitations on the scope of discussion. Such limitations,
however, may be necessary because consultation seems increasingly a
position which can be held only temporarily, with collective bargaining
frequently replacing it.-15 When the replacement occurs, the scope of
bargaining will be a battleground, and the outcome may be affected
by the positions the parties staked out for themselves at the con-
sultation stage.
Statutes that do impose an obligation on a public employer to bar-
gain often follow the language of the National Labor Relations Act:
the employer is under a duty to bargain over "wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment."' 4 Countless decisions of the
NLRB and the courts have elaborated this federal requirement. The
following may be taken as a too general, but for the purposes suffi-
ciently accurate, summary of that elaboration: The duty is one re-
quiring bargaining in good faith; that is, with a sincere desire to reach
agreement. 147 It does not, however, require agreement.4 8 Nor does it
preclude an employer from bargaining in good faith for unilateral con-
trol over a matter (pension plans, for example) subject to the dutyY190
Some matters, moreover, are not subject to the duty; that is, the em-
ployer need not, if he chooses not to, negotiate about them with the
union. These are matters-the price of a product would be a clear
example-which have been held not to come within the phrase "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment."' 50 While most
matters unions raise in bargaining arguably fall within that phrase
(and arguably should be held so to fall) many matters have nevertheless
been excluded by the Board or courts. Indeed, unless a matter is
likely to have a significant impact on unit employee's job interests, it
will probably not be subject to the bargaining duty.151 And the courts
have held that some "business decisions" are not within the duty even
though they do have a significant impact on employment. -52 The effect
of the business decision on employees, however, is negotiable.
This body of federal law ought to have little influence on the scope
145. See, eg., Klaus, supra note 118.
146. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-469 (Supp. 1969) (duty to bargain in good
faith "with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment ... .
147. See, eg., NLR.B v. Reed 8- Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 US. 887 (1953).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
149. NLR.B v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
150. See NLR13 v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 US. 342 (1958).
151. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
152. See Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 L%13. L.J.
143 (1968).
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of bargaining problem as it develops in public employment, for the
underlying problems to which the federal law is a response are very
different from those with which we are concerned. In the first place,
federal law reflects mainly solutions to issues which arise out of large-
scale manufacturing. The legal problems which come before the
NLRB involve the effect on employees of the technological innovations
taking place in industry. In public employment the legal problems in
the public sector will, by and large, result from social and political
change rather than a technological innovation.
In the second place, as we have observed, the stakes in the two situ-
ations are very different. The market disciplines the private sector
more directly and insistently than it does the public. Therefore, an
expanded bargaining agenda in the private sector means only that
unions are trading off benefits in some areas for benefits in others. As
we have said, this trade-off occurs less frequently in the public sector.
While it is impossible now to say how state agencies and courts
will deal with the phrase, "wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment," it seems clear to us, given the lack of further
legislative guidance, that agencies and courts are unsuited to their as
signed task. Elaboration of this seemingly innocuous phrase will re-
quire agencies and courts to resolve issues that are politically, socially
and ideologically frequently among the more explosive in our society;
ones that adjudicatory tribunals are institutionally ill-suited to resolve.
Agencies and courts are not forums in which contesting interest groups
should be able to influence decisions through the skillful employment
of political pressure. Either the legislature or some multi-party bar-
gaining structure is the appropriate forum for deciding these types of
questions. This does not mean that there is no role for administrative
agencies and courts, but that if they are to perform properly they
need standards and, in this area, fairly specific standards at that.
Some jurisdictions have provided standards. One example is Nevada
which, after using the phrase "wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment," enacted the management's rights clause of
Executive Order 10988. That order regulated federal employee rela-
tions from January 17, 1962 to October 29, 1969, and the manage-
ment's rights provision in its Nevada form provides:
Each local government employer is entitled, without negotiation
or reference to any agreement resulting from negotiation: (a) To
direct its employees; (b) To hire, promote, classify, transfer, as-
sign, retain, suspend, demote, discharge or take disciplinary action
against any employee; (c) To relieve any employee from duty be-
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cause of lack of work or for any other legitimate reason; (d) To
maintain the efficiency of its governmental operations; (e) To
determine the methods, means and personnel by which its opera-
tions are to be conducted; and (f) To take whatever actions may be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities in situations of emer-
gency.153
Even more explicit, perhaps, is the provision in the New York City
statute:
It is the right of the City, acting through its agencies, to deter-mine the standards of services to be offered by its agencies; de-
termine the standards of selection for employment; direct its
employees; take disciplinary action; relieve its employees from
duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons;
maintain the efficiency of governmental operations; determine
the methods, means and personnel by which government opera-
tions are to be conducted; determine the content of job classifica-
tions; take all necessary actions to carry out its mission in emer-
gencies; and exercise complete control and discretion over its
organization and the technology of performing its work. The
City's decisions on those matters are not within the scope of collec-
tive bargaining, but, notwithstanding the above, questions con-
cerning the practical impact that decisions on the above matters
have on employees, such as questions of workload or manning, are
within the scope of collective bargaining.' ra
The approach of New York City and Nevada seems promising, and
the language of the former ("to determine the standards of services to
be offered by its agencies") is at least partly responsive to the concerns
here expressed. The difficulty with the New York City statute is that
the contribution of professional and semi-professional employees, if it
is to be made through the bargaining process, must meet a test which
is irrelevant to their professional status. Managerial decisions are not
within the scope of bargaining, but questions concerning the "practical
impact that [such] decisions ... have on employees, such as questions
of workload or manning, are within the scope of collective bargaining."
This approach can be both too restrictive, where there is no "practical
impact," and too liberal, where "the standards of services" plainly do
have the necessary impact. In both situations, a limited contribution
for employees may be desirable. The New York City statute seems more
153. Nev. Local Gov. Employee-Management Relations Act, ch. 650, L. 19G9, § 10.2,
reproduced in 4a LAB. REn REP. 38 S.L.L. 227 (1969). The Kennedy executive order may
be found at 27 FE. REG. 551 (1962).
154. The Conduct of Labor Relations between the City of New York and its Employees,
N.Y. City, Executive Order No. 52, § 5C (Sept. 29, 1967).
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influenced than it should have been by the industrial model of col-
lective bargaining-a model that is appropriate for some municipal
employees but not for others. 5
An approach that is responsive to the underlying problem is found
in the Maine public employees right to bargain statute as it applies
to public education. Maine requires school boards:
To confer and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
working conditions and contract grievance arbitration . . . (and
to] meet and consult but not negotiate with respect to educational
policies[;] for the purpose of this paragraph, educational policies
shall not include wages, hours, working conditions or contract
grievance arbitration.15
The Maine experiment deserves to be watched with care. In situa-
tions where collective bargaining has itself provided for consultation
over matters of educational policy, and the two have been employed
together as joint methods of ordering, consultation generally either has
atrophied or has been a preliminary phase to expanded collective bar-
gaining.157 But because Maine establishes bargaining and consultation
by statute, these prior experiences may not foretell the fate of that
state's experiment.
3. Three Suggested Approaches
As alternatives to the Maine statute, we would suggest three ap-
proaches to the scope of bargaining question in public employment.
First, in addition to collective bargaining over "traditional" subjects,
it may be possible, in some municipalities and for some employees, to
establish multi-party bargaining over subjects that relate to the nature
of the services the employees provide. For example, in education there
is good reason to believe that decentralization of educational policy-
making is desirable and that orderly community participation in
schools is a goal worth pursuing. Whatever the appropriate decen-
tralized unit may be (and it generally should be different from the
traditional bargaining unit), three-party bargaining in the appropriate
unit might proceed on some or all matters of educational policy.
Where school decentralization exists, the "employer," whether the
central school board or mayor, cannot effectively represent the interests
155. See City of N.Y. (Fire Dep't), Office of Collective Bargaining Docu. No. B-9.68,
271 GERR G-1 (Nov. 18, 1968). Cf. BCB-22, Decision 16, GERR No. 280, at C.1 (Jan. 20,
1969).
156. Chap. 9-A Laws 1969, as amended by Ch. 578, Law 1970, § 965.1.C., reproduted
at 29 S.L.L. 218 in 4 LAB. REL. REP. (1970).
157. See Klaus, supra note 135; T. Brunner, supra note 122.
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of the smaller unit. In such a case, the statute or ordinance establishing
the smaller unit, or the collective agreement with the teachers for that
matter, ought to provide for intervention by a specific third party. The
third party should be a representative and duly elected community
group, for example, parents with students in the school or schools. And
it ought to have the power to intervene as a matter of right where its
interests are affected. The proposal envisions that the three-party bar-
gaining should aim for formal agreement which would be an accommo-
dation of the interest groups principally concerned: the teachers, school
management, and the most affected portion of a particular community.
One can claim for this proposal more than labor relations benefits.
Few areas of major public concern will profit more than the public
schools from a multiplicity of Brandeisian "chambers of experimenta-
tion." For few institutions are more in quest of themselves, and more
at a loss to discover their identity.
Our second proposal looks to the suggestive example of third party
bargaining in San Francisco. As we remarked earlier, the Chamber of
Commerce has at times become a de facto party to the bargaining be-
tween the city and its employees. The ability of the Chamber to inter-
vene stems from its ability to submit wage settlements to a referendum.
Since a favorable vote is politically assured if the Chamber agrees to
the settlement, the unions involved have found it to their advantage
to make their peace with the Chamber as an independent party with
an interest in the bargaining.
Analogous structures for the settlement of non-monetary issues in
which other groups in the community feel that they have an interest
can be constructed. Intervention by a third party might be permitted
upon the petition of a certain number of citizens. Or a referendum
over an issue might be required on such a petition, thus compelling
the unions involved to seek out representatives of opposing interests.
These devices may be too permissive to opposing interest groups, how-
ever, and too disruptive of the bargaining process. A structure might
be created in which a member of the ratifying body, be it the board of
aldermen, city council, or school board, can register his conditional
dissent as to a particular non-monetary provision in a contract while
voting to approve the whole. If a certain percentage, 20% for instance,
register a dissent to a provision, then a referendum will be held on
that particular issue but only if a certain number of voters petition for
it within a fixed period of time. Otherwise, the contract in ioto will
go into effect. Such a structure creates a deterrent to the resolution of
hotly contested political issues at the bargaining table without concern
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for the interests of other groups in the society and encourages unions
to seek out and bargain with these groups as third parties. A defeat in
a referendum may be more damaging than a compromise worked out
in advance. And, under this structure, the form of third party interven-
tion and bargaining is left to the parties. The opposing interest groups,
moreover, are compelled to work through the political process by
exercising influence on their elected representatives. This permits the
executive and the union to learn at a relatively early stage what groups
are interested and to test the intensity and nature of that interest. And,
finally, if agreement is not reached, the decision is left to the voters.
Our third proposal is sharply different. It does not create a bargain-
ing procedure for resolving issues with political impact but rather
looks to the strict monitoring of the scope of bargaining by govern-
mental commissions. The model is this: 1) A state with a general and
comprehensive statute covering public employment, but with a pro-
vision limiting collective bargaining to traditional subject matter. 2)
The establishment of commissions of disinterested citizens, appointed
by the Governor, with a continuing charter to hold hearings from time
to time, and, where it seems in the public interest, to make proposals
to the legislature for special enactments permitting bargaining with
respect to specific matters, affecting the nature of the service performed
by particular public employees. The model envisions a number of
commissions, each with responsibility for particular professional and
semi-professional employees. This model proceeds from the assumption
that some bargaining over some aspects of the nature of the service
performed by professional and semi-professional public employees is
desirable but that the decision on this question should be the result
of interactions and accommodations of competing interest groups. The
model structures and institutionalizes that process, and it is a two-step
process: before the specialized commission, and then before the legis-
lature. Only after legislation would there be collective bargaining.
All proposals have drawbacks: three-party bargaining makes agree-
ment difficult to achieve; commissions complicate an already cumber-
some process. No proposal, quite apart from these drawbacks, can
possibly solve the underlying problem. There is no solution to it any
more than there is to the strike problem. But to look for solutions for
these difficult social problems is profoundly to misunderstand their
nature. The quest is not to solve but to diminish; not to cure but to
manage. And it is this hard truth that makes so many so frustrated, for
it takes great courage to surrender a belief in the existence of total
solutions, without also surrendering the ability to care.
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